The US blockade against Cuba in figures

8 minutes of blockade amount to the annual funding needed for special education programs serving children and youth with hearing impairments (129,500 dollars.)

13 minutes of blockade equal the amount of resources required nationwide for children with visual disabilities (203,970 dollars.)

16 minutes of blockade equal the yearly expense of acquiring Nusinersen, the medication used to treat infantile spinal atrophy (250,000 dollars.)

46 minutes of blockade represent the cost of importing parts from distant markets to repair or replace water pumping equipment (714,400 dollars).

3 hours of blockade amount to the funds needed to cover infertility treatment abroad for 109 couples (2,900,000 dollars.)

3 full days of blockade equal the investment required to modernize Cuba's banking system with new technology (65,000,000 dollars.)

4 days of blockade equal the cost of importing all the fuel needed to meet the country's economic demand (78,510,000 dollars.)

Introduction

This document constitutes Cuba's contribution to the report requested by the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) pursuant to resolution A/RES/80/4, entitled "Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States of America against Cuba," adopted by an overwhelming majority in the context of the UN General Assembly on October 29, 2025.

Between March 1, 2025, and February 28, 2026, the blockade inflicted damages on Cuba amounting to a record **8,083,300,000 USD**—7% higher than the already elevated figure cited in the previous report. The annex to this document provides a breakdown of the impacts across different sectors of Cuban society.

Over the years, the cumulative damages caused by the blockade have reached 178,700,500,000 USD at current prices, 4.7% higher than the figure reported earlier. When factoring in the sharp rise in the price of gold against the dollar, the accumulated total stands at 3,896,505,000,000 USD**.**

Without the blockade, Cuba's GDP at current prices in 2025 would have been 10.8% higher than the estimated value for that year.

The colossal scale of these damages comes as no surprise, since the President of the United States (U.S.), Donald Trump, remarked on January 8, 2026, when referring to his government's policy on Cuba: "*I don't think much more pressure can be exerted, except to go in and smash the place*."

After more than 60 years of strict enforcement, the purpose of the blockade remains the same: to bring down the Cuban Revolution. To that end, shortages are fostered, Cuba's social and productive fabric is undermined, and attempts are made to isolate our country, in the hope that Cubans will give up their resolve to shape their own future.

No statement captures the intent of the blockade more vividly than that of then-U.S. Undersecretary of State Lester Mallory, in his memorandum of April 6, 1960: *"(...) every possible means should be taken promptly to weaken the economic life of Cuba (...) a line of action which, while as adroit and inconspicuous as possible, makes the greatest inroads in denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government."*

During the past year, the U.S. government has stepped up its efforts to strangle and isolate the Cuban Revolution. To this end, the imposition of an energy blockade on Cuba and the implementation of a sweeping system of secondary sanctions targeting any foreign entity that invests in or trades with Cuban institutions have been incorporated as tools of maximum pressure.

This is compounded by the harmful effects of Cuba's unjustifiable inclusion on the unilateral, arbitrary, and fraudulent list of countries allegedly sponsoring terrorism, issued by the U.S. Department of State, together with the aggressive financial persecution and the strict enforcement of the laws codifying the blockade, above all the Helms-Burton Act.

Another sign of the growing aggressiveness of the United States has been its reckless and dangerous resort to increasingly menacing rhetoric against Cuba's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Throughout the first half of 2026, senior U.S. officials repeatedly issued statements suggesting the possible use of force to dismantle Cuba's political and economic system. The violation of the right to self-determination and the interference in Cuba's internal affairs has been unmistakable.

Such declarations are part of a broader campaign of psychological warfare directed at the Cuban people, designed to heighten anxiety and distress in everyday life and to provoke a social upheaval.

As the blockade has been reinforced to unprecedented extremes and U.S. aggression against Cuba has grown steadily and deliberately more multidimensional, the Cuban people have endured a sharp decline in their quality of life and immeasurable humanitarian harm. Since early 2026, daily life has been marked by an almost total absence of fuel, long and distressing blackouts, widespread disruptions in the national power grid, recurring failures in water supply, severe obstacles to solid waste collection, and persistent shortages of food and medicine. At the heart of each of these hardships lies the blockade as the common cause.

The energy blockade, wielded as collective punishment upon the Cuban people

On January 29, 2026, the U.S. blockade was escalated to unprecedented levels with the formal imposition of an energy blockade on Cuba. That day, the U.S. President signed Executive Order (EO 14380), authorizing additional tariffs on imports from any country that sold or supplied oil to Cuba, whether directly or indirectly.

The measure was justified under the absurd claim that Cuba posed an "unusual and extraordinary threat" to U.S. national security and foreign policy.

It should be noted that only weeks later, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the President had no legal authority to impose tariffs without congressional approval, striking down all such tariffs imposed by President Trump on various countries. Yet in Cuba's case, the constant threat of force—including the interception of oil tankers—and the climate of fear created by the possible use of other coercive measures have led to an almost total blockade of fuel supplies to the island nation.

As a result of these pressures, during the first half of 2026 only a single tanker from the Russian Federation arrived in Cuba, carrying humanitarian aid. Its load of 100,000 tons of crude oil offered some relief and stood as a clear gesture of solidarity, yet it covered only a small fraction of Cuba's energy requirements. By the close of May 2026, the nation was short by 2,667,800 tons of fuel compared to planned availability.

The president of the Republic of Cuba, Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, has publicly described how many communities have endured more than 30 straight hours without electricity. This ordeal has bred irritability, malaise, hardship, and deep anxiety among the population—effects that align with the objectives spelled out in Lester D. Mallory's 1960 memorandum.

An assessment of Cuba's power system at the close of May 2026 revealed that roughly 1,400 MW of available capacity remained idle for lack of fuel. Diesel-engine generation operated at just 18.5 percent, leaving 338.3 GWh unproduced, while fuel-engine generation reached only 14.5 percent of its target, falling short by 644.5 GWh.

Because of the energy blockade, Cuba's electricity deficit has grown dramatically in 2026. In the economic sector, only 54.6 percent of an already deficient plan was met. In the residential sector, fulfillment reached 83 percent, meaning households across the island faced an average of more than 20 hours of blackouts.

The imposition of the energy blockade marks a deepening of the U.S. policy of persecuting Cuba's fuel supplies, which began in July 2019 and expanded to include the illegal interception of Venezuelan oil shipments since late 2025.

This U.S. strategy to cripple Cuba's national power system led thermal generation in 2025 to produce only 7,789 GWh—down by 1,046.6 GWh compared to 2024, when output through these technologies had reached 8,836 GWh.

Reports from Unión Eléctrica indicate that restrictions prevented the execution of partial, extended, and major maintenance on the country's thermal units, leaving 11 of the 15 units outside the capital maintenance cycle.

This energy blockade, together with other extreme measures of intensification, amounts to an act of genocide, a form of collective punishment against the Cuban people, and a grave violation of International Law, International Human Rights Law, and even International Humanitarian Law—despite the absence of a conventional state of war between the United States and Cuba.

On February 12, 2026, four special procedure mandate holders of the United Nations Human Rights Council[1] released a statement expressing grave concern under International Human Rights Law. They emphasized that this executive order further intensifies the impact of the United States' unlawful designation of Cuba as a so-called State sponsor of terrorism.

[1] The Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism; the Special Rapporteur on the right to food; and the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights.

On May 7, 2026, the special procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council[2] issued a new statement highlighting the energy deprivation imposed on Cuba by the United States since the January 29 Executive Order. They stressed that the resort to an energy blockade runs counter to international human rights norms, as its consequences extend across vital spheres such as education and healthcare, with a particular impact on Cuban children.

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, speaking through its spokesperson, recognized that these restrictions were endangering essential national services—healthcare, food supply, and water systems—given their heavy reliance on imported fuels. The Office also stressed that intensive care units, along with the storage of blood and temperature-sensitive medicines, were being jeopardized by the inability to procure fuel.

During a press briefing by the Secretary-General’s spokesperson held on February 26, the Resident Coordinator of the United Nations System in Cuba stated that the energy shortage had become the main multiplier of humanitarian risks for the Cuban population. Similarly, the UN Secretary-General, through his spokesperson, expressed concern over the growing scarcity of fuels in Cuba and its impact on the population.

On May 7, 2026, the Director-General of the World Health Organization, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, likewise stated, in reference to this measure imposed on Cuba, that health must be protected at all costs and must never be left at the mercy of geopolitics, energy blockades, or blackouts.

Taken together, these pronouncements from UN officials are consistent with Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which prohibits collective punishment—a reality to which the Cuban people are unmistakably being subjected through the energy blockade.

In addition, the Executive Order of January 29, 2026 infringes upon the sovereign rights of third States, particularly in their commercial relations, by threatening them with secondary coercive measures should they supply fuel to Cuba. This underscores the extraterritorial nature of the policy and confirms that the blockade is not a bilateral matter, despite U.S. claims to the contrary.

The aforementioned Executive Order likewise breaches the principles of free trade and navigation, and contravenes the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). It stands as a clear and unlawful barrier to Cuba’s fuel trade with its partners and suppliers. In doing so, the United States attempts to dictate to sovereign nations with whom they may—or may not—exchange their own natural resources.

A closer look reveals a set of grave and more specific breaches of International Law. Chief among them is the violation of the principle of non-discrimination, a cornerstone of

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[2] The Special Rapporteur on the right to development; the Special Rapporteur on the right to food; and the Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation.

the WTO. The chilling effect of this Executive Order has effectively pushed Cuba out of the global fuel supply chain—a situation that can only be deemed unlawful and discriminatory.

Beyond its illegality, the energy blockade is marked by sheer cynicism. While it pressures third countries to refrain from supplying fuels to Cuba and denies public institutions the possibility to procure them, the U.S. government reserves for itself the prerogative of allowing its companies to export fuels solely to Cuba's non-state sector and to foreign embassies on the island.

With this, the U.S. government seeks to prevent the arrival of fuels essential for the national power grid, drinking water supply, healthcare services, public transport, communications, educational institutions, community services, and every sphere of social life tied to the Cuban State.

Thus, on June 19, 2026, Aguas de La Habana announced that, owing to the strain on water sources caused by the energy shortfall—stemming from the fuel deficit—water distribution intervals for residents of the capital would have to be extended even further.

Countless examples reveal the harsh reality endured by thousands of Cuban workers—especially those in the non-state sector—since the oil blockade was imposed. Taxi drivers have been forced off the roads for lack of fuel. Artisans and owners of rental houses, bars, and restaurants, who were left practically without clients, as the arrival of international flights—and consequently tourists—dwindled, given that Cuba has been unable to access aviation fuel. More broadly, every small enterprise has been hit: unable to shoulder the cost of importing fuel on their own, they remain tied to the severely impacted national energy system and suffer constant disruptions in trying to keep their businesses alive.

The consequences go far beyond economic losses for Cuba's non-state sector. At the heart of it lies the anguish of families watching their livelihoods shrink. It also exposes the falsehood of Washington's long-standing claim that its measures target only the government and the state economy.

The energy blockade has been so absolute that it has become impossible to ignore, even by the mainstream U.S. press or by top figures of the U.S. government, who have repeatedly gloated in stating that Cuba has no oil and is therefore on the verge of collapse.

A striking example is the opinion piece that appeared in *The New York Times* on May 12, 2026, written by U.S. Representatives Pramila Jayapal and Jonathan L. Jackson, in which they shared their impressions from their April 2026 trip to Cuba. They wrote of being deeply moved by the inhuman impact of the energy blockade and declared unequivocally: **"***If the American people knew the magnitude of what is really happening in Cuba, they would demand the immediate end of the blockade*."

The fuel shortage into which the nation has been plunged has had a devastating impact on almost every sphere of society.

In healthcare, the energy blockade strikes at the very core of patients' survival, revealing its cruel and genocidal nature. In the neonatology ward of a leading maternity hospital, the lives of the most vulnerable newborns hang on an unstable power supply. Doctor Niurka Moreno Obregón, who heads the unit, warns that every blackout forces an aging generator to kick in within ten seconds—because many ventilators no longer have working batteries. If that margin is exceeded, ventilation must be done manually, with uncertain outcomes.

Incubators, scales, and over 95 percent of the equipment are compromised, all dependent on electricity that is never secure. Like 148 other hospitals across the country, this center endures an energy "asphyxiation" that reaches even the delivery rooms.

Doctor Yudmila Rodríguez Verdecia, chief anesthesiologist and head of the obstetric operating theater, recounts: "*When an electrical emergency occurs, a blackout, the entire unit shuts down. We are plunged into complete darkness." She continues: "The surgery cannot be stopped. We have had to keep operating under the glow of cell phone flashlights*," a vivid account of the tense moments her team has faced.

The danger is both immediate and multifaceted. In neonatology, the cradle stops working, leaving newborns without the warmth they need—wrapped hastily in blankets as a desperate substitute. The anesthesia machine, the very heart of the operating room, goes dark. A backup oxygen supply may keep the patient alive, but, as doctors warn, "*we are left with absolutely no monitoring"*.

Children battling cancer face the same peril. Each year, between 300 and 400 Cuban children and adolescents are diagnosed with cancer, their survival tied to medicines and specialized equipment that cannot function without power.

It is not only the patients who suffer as a result of the limitations imposed by the blockade. Their families are also victims, repeatedly enduring the anguish and emotional toll of uncertainty caused by these shortages.

Licet Rodríguez Alonso has stood by her son Diego for nearly four years, since he was diagnosed with cancer at the age of fifteen. Between Villa Clara and Havana, their lives revolve around surgeries, chemotherapy, and radiation. Today Diego is in radiotherapy—a treatment dependent on energy-hungry machines and scarce fuel.

"How could I not be worried?" Licet asks. "Diego is in radiation, but there's no fuel. How will those machines run? If the hospital shuts down, how can I keep Diego's treatment going?"

The blockade's energy restrictions and resource shortages have gravely undermined hospital operations. Today, Cuba's surgical waiting list stands at 100,000 patients—including 12,000 children. And with the ongoing energy blockade, the numbers keep climbing, as the health system is compelled to delay non-urgent procedures to safeguard capacity for oncological procedures and other surgeries where lives hang in the balance.

Meanwhile, fuel shortages have disrupted refrigerated transport, preventing over 30,000 children from getting their vaccines on schedule—even though the doses sit ready in national warehouses. Equally affected are 2,888 patients who rely on hemodialysis, a treatment that demands a steady energy supply now nearly impossible to secure.
This dramatic situation has drawn the attention of the Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, who declared: *"The situation in Cuba is deeply concerning as the country struggles to maintain the provision of health services in a time of immense turbulence,"* stressing that the energy shortage *"has been affecting health*."

The head of the WHO acknowledged that Cuban hospitals are struggling to keep emergency and intensive care services running. He stressed: "*Cuba's hospitals, clinics, and ambulances are needed now more than ever, and they must be supported so they can continue their vital mission of saving lives."*

In line with these statements, the Resident Coordinator of the United Nations System in Cuba has warned of 32,000 pregnant women at risk due to instability in access to prenatal services.

The spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General also expressed concern over the thousands of cancer patients in need of radiotherapy and chemotherapy, who are unable to receive the required treatment because of blackouts and lack of resources.

The blockade's genocidal character is starkly reflected in the decline of cancer survival rates in Cuba. The number of people dying from cancer in the country has risen significantly with daily cancer deaths surging past 70. While Cuba's survival rates still surpass those of many middle- and low-income nations—and even exceed WHO benchmarks—they have nonetheless dropped in recent years. Among children and youth, survival has plummeted from 85% to 65%, a decline that mirrors the toughest phases of the U.S. energy blockade.

Following their May 2026 visit to Cuba, the heads of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' Crisis Response Division and the WHO's Humanitarian and Disaster Management confirmed that fuel shortages are striking directly at public health and limiting access to healthcare facilities.

In the education sector, the fuel shortage has limited the transportation of students and teachers across the country, who account for nearly 30% of total enrollment. The shortage has thrown off the rhythm of teaching and learning, disrupted planned extracurricular activities, unsettled institutional schedules, and reduced the personalized attention students once received.

In higher education, the first semester of classes in 2026 had to be shifted to a fully remote modality, thus affecting interaction between teachers and students.

Special education continues to face major difficulties despite the efforts of institutions in the sector to support both students and their families. For example, schools like Flor de la Revolución—which serves 232 visually impaired children from seven Havana municipalities—require stable school transportation in order to provide the necessary care to its students.

Electrical instability also shapes the school routine: classrooms require proper lighting, and during blackouts, classes are moved to courtyards or hallways. The School principal warns that the lack of electricity even affects the children's meals and rest, impacting their academic performance.

Food production has likewise been severely affected by the energy blockade. During the cold-season agricultural campaign that ended in early 2026, irrigation averaged only 2 hours per day out of the 16 hours normally required, breaking cycles and slashing yields—all due to fuel scarcity.

At the same time, the UN country team in Cuba reported having around 20,000 tons of pre-positioned food in national warehouses, the distribution of which to vulnerable communities has slowed to a crawl due to fuel deficit.

For similar reasons, Cuban transport authorities have had to implement organizational measures to reduce the number of inter-provincial trips, cargo transport, and other transportation modalities.

In the case of air transport, it has been far more difficult to find alternatives given the impossibility of acquiring the required fuels. In fact, just days after the January 29 Executive Order was announced, Cuba's civil aviation authority had to declare the impossibility of supplying aviation fuel (Jet A-1) at Cuban airports.

This has had a disastrous effect on tourism in Cuba, reducing the avenues for travelers to enter the country. It should be noted that by the end of 2025, contracts signed with international tour operators projected favorable occupancy rates for the winter season beginning in early 2026. However, the imposition of the energy blockade abruptly shattered these recovery prospects.

Expansion of secondary sanctions as tools to reinforce the enforcement of the blockade and its extraterritorial nature

As if the implementation of the previously described measures were not sufficient punishment against the Cuban people, the U.S. government decided to further increase

its pressure on Cuba by issuing, on May 1, 2026, another Executive Order (EO 14404), under the false narrative of responding to the slanderous and ridiculous assertion of *"an unusual and extraordinary threat posed by Cuba to the national security of the United States,"* decreed in the January 29, 2026 Executive Order.
The May 1 Executive Order exacerbates the extraterritorial nature of the blockade on Cuba, as it authorizes the freezing of assets and the restriction of operations of any foreign person or entity operating in sectors considered strategic to the Cuban economy–explicitly energy, mining, finance, security, and defense. It likewise authorizes sanctions against those who have provided financial, material, technological, or logistical support to the Cuban government or state.

The explicit reference to the energy and financial sectors is deliberate, reflecting a calculated design intended to secure the enforcement of the energy blockade and to intensify the cumulative effects of the economic, commercial, and financial blockade as a whole.

A particularly novel and incisive feature of this Executive Order lies in the imposition of stringent secondary sanctions on banks, financial institutions, and foreign enterprises that facilitate transactions involving "sanctioned" individuals or entities.

In practice, the decree tightens the screws on third countries, companies, and financial institutions with ties to Cuba—or even those that might one day establish them. The U.S. Administration wields the fear of losing access to the U.S. market and financial system as its weapon of coercion, once again laying bare the extraterritorial nature of the blockade.

The May 1 Executive Order also provides for migration and entry restrictions to the United States for individuals whom the U.S. government deems to have provided material support to the Cuban state. Clearly, this measure serves as yet another heavy-handed tool of deterrence and intimidation, designed to discourage third parties from engaging with Cuba.

Due to similar fears, several airlines announced the suspension of their operations with Cuba. Notably, Plus Ultra, contracted by Cubana de Aviación to cover the Madrid–Santiago de Cuba–Havana route, announced on May 12 that it was halting services, explicitly citing the risks posed by the Executive Order and framing the move as a force majeure event beyond its control.

The renowned international shipping companies Hapag-Lloyd and CMA CGM ceased accepting new orders bound for Cuba, while assessing the possible consequences of the May 1 Executive Order. Though the full scope, duration, and economic impact remain uncertain, Cuba's supply chains are certain to come under greater strain given the central role these companies play in international maritime cargo transport.

Linked to these developments, UN agencies in Cuba report that over 2,900 metric tons of humanitarian food aid already contracted have been disrupted by interruptions in maritime services. Seven critical shipments worth USD 630,000 have also been affected—containing emergency medical kits, newborn supplies, nutritional support for expectant and nursing mothers, water treatment equipment, and menstrual hygiene kits.

Executive Order 14404 has also led to the suspension of financial services that banking institutions provided to Cuba for the execution of its international transactions. Payments through Visa and Mastercard became unworkable in the Island as Cuba's correspondent banks declined to continue this relationship due to the risks they faced vis-à-vis the United States.

This financial isolation has been a key objective in the U.S. strategy to sink the Cuban economy. Its consequences go beyond mere transactions left incomplete. In reality, it entails the impossibility of purchasing shipments of food, inputs for pharmaceutical production, machinery for Cuban industry, among other needs, regardless of whether funds are available.

On the other hand, the crusade initiated by U.S. authorities upon the enactment of Executive Order 14404 has pursued the explicit objective of dismantling Cuba's hotel industry, given the importance of tourism as one of the country's main economic activities.

In early June 2026, several leading international hotel chains with business in Cuba abandoned their management agreements for dozens of hotels in the country, fearing reprisals against their assets and bank accounts in the United States.

Under the May 1 Executive Order, the U.S. Departments of State and Treasury have undertaken a veritable witch hunt against anyone with business in or ties to Cuba. The breadth of these actions reveals a second objective of this strategy: beyond inducing the collapse of Cuba's economic, political, and social system, the United States seeks to deter any potential commercial rival in pursuit of its desired goal of total control over the Island.

In the energy sector, to leave no doubt about the breadth of its siege, the United States sanctioned the Cuban state company Unión Cuba-Petróleo (CUPET) on June 11, 2026 under Order 14404. In doing so, the U.S. government shut the door on the possibility of carrying out any commercial operation involving large-scale fuel supplies to Cuba (through tankers), even when private Cuban operators were involved, since CUPET's infrastructure is indispensable for the transport, storage, and safe preservation of large quantities of these resources.

The application of these measures has produced a sophisticated mechanism of asphyxiation directed at the Cuban population, exceeding by far the levels of pressure historically imposed over decades. Following several months of enforcement of these intensified coercive methods, a tangible deterioration in the quality of life has been observed. The Cuban people, who had already endured with notable stoicism the cumulative impact and privations of the blockade, now face an aggravated scenario.

No people deserve nor should be subjected to such punishment solely on account of asserting its right to self-determination.

Consequences of the enforcement of the Helms-Burton Act and Cuba's inclusion on the unilateral U.S. list of State Sponsors of Terrorism

The implementation of the Helms-Burton Act, particularly Title III, as well as the financial persecution stemming from Cuba's arbitrary inclusion on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, have been two key tools in the policy of maximum pressure against Cuba and in the reinforcement of the blockade since 2019.

Under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, U.S. courts may hear lawsuits against any individual or company involved with properties nationalized by the Cuban government. The threat of litigation has become a powerful deterrent, discouraging investment and business in Cuba as foreign partners fear being dragged into legal battles in United States courts.

By the end of March 2026, 46 lawsuits had been filed under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, of which 24 remain ongoing. The main areas targeted by proceedings arising from the application of this law include tourism, shipping, mining, construction, fuel supply and distribution, airlines, and agriculture. Paradoxically, most of the companies that have been the focus of these lawsuits are themselves from the U.S.

On November 25, 2025, Delta Airlines faced a new lawsuit brought by José Ramón López Regueiro, who claims to be the rightful heir of Havana's José Martí International Airport.

In order to more precisely illustrate the extraterritorial repercussions of the blockade on tourism, and the infringement of rights of individuals in third countries, reference may be made to an article published in *The Pointer* on January 21, 2026.

This piece recounts the story of a Canadian family who, wishing to travel to Cuba, attempted to use reward points accumulated on their Toronto Dominion Bank (TD) card to redeem flights and accommodation on the Island through the Expedia platform. When they entered "Havana" in the site's search engine, they received a message indicating that this option was unavailable. The family learned that Expedia Group has blocked reservations to Cuba—even for non-U.S. customers—citing legal risks arising from the U.S. blockade, including the application of the Helms-Burton Act.

The absurd and arbitrary maintenance of Cuba on the fraudulent list of States allegedly sponsoring terrorism, compiled by the U.S. Department of State remains a major obstacle to national development. This measure has contributed to strengthening the extraterritorial nature of the blockade, as international entities have adopted heightened caution and disengagement from Cuban counterparts, motivated by apprehension over potential U.S. reprisals.

This unilateral and unfounded designation, for which the U.S. government has not produced a single evidentiary basis, operates as an instrument of aggression and deliberately disregards Cuba's established record of cooperation in counter-terrorism. It is broadly acknowledged, including within U.S. law enforcement agencies, that Cuba has been a victim rather than a sponsor of terrorism, and that it has adhered rigorously to its international obligations in this domain.

The economic repercussions of Cuba's inclusion have been devastating. Between March 2025 and February 2026, 34 international banking institutions either suspended or declined to conduct operations with Cuba, citing apprehension over secondary sanctions. This entailed the cancellation of accounts and the rejection of transfers intended for the acquisition of food, medicaments, and fuel. Consequently, the Cuban economy experienced the withdrawal of traditional suppliers, who terminated commercial relations to avoid the risk of being sanctioned.

In addition, this measure has resulted in the imposition of interest surcharges as a consequence of the country-risk classification applied to Cuba. As a result, access to financing by national banking and business entities continues to decline compared to previous periods, which translates into reduced production and services across the Cuban domestic economy.

The unfavorable position of financial institutions in processing payments, together with the inability to access expedited logistical channels, compelled Cuba to shoulder steep extra costs to secure essential supplies. These burdens have magnified the cumulative nature of the blockade and its protracted attritional consequences.

Digital platforms and technological services also suffered the effects of this designation. Cuban hosts on lodging platforms saw their payments suspended, companies lost access to email services provided by U.S.-linked providers, and accounts of solidarity campaigns raising funds for donations were closed.

Many Cuban diplomatic missions in multiple regions encountered significant obstacles with banking institutions that had historically provided services. This disruption undermined their operational capacity and financial sustainability, including the processing of payments for consular services.

During the period under review, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Department of the Treasury continued imposing fines on companies doing business with Cuba. Though such measure is devoid of legitimacy—inasmuch as the United States lacks competence to adjudicate matters between third parties—these measures have demonstrated considerable efficacy in disrupting and discouraging commercial relations with the Island.

On July 2, 2025, OFAC levied a fine amounting to 608,825 dollars on the Delaware-based private global logistics company Key Holding, LLC, for alleged violations of the sanctions regime against Cuba. OFAC determined that the Colombian subsidiary of Key Holding, LLC—then operating as Key Logistics Colombia SAS—handled the logistics for 36 cargo shipments bound for Cuba between January 2022 and July 2023.

On July 15, 2025, OFAC announced the imposition of another fine, this time amounting to 11,832,136 dollars against the private global logistics company Interactive Brokers, LLC (IB), headquartered in Greenwich, Connecticut, for violations of its sanctions regime on Cuba. OFAC determined that between July 15, 2016, and January 31, 2024, IB provided brokerage and investment services to individuals residing in various countries, including Cuba.

Concurrently, Cuba's arbitrary designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism has been invoked as grounds for denying the online U.S. travel authorization (ESTA visa) to citizens of otherwise eligible countries who have visited the Island.

The Office of the Historian of Havana reports a notable decline in private investment in prioritized restoration zones due to the downturn in tourism, which has led to reduced economic activity in the city's heritage areas.

By contrast, figures from the Office reveal that in the final years of the Obama administration, private investment surged in tourism-related activities—lodging, dining, and leisure. This wave of investment fueled a remarkable boom in the restoration of properties across Havana's Historic Center.

Overall, the arbitrary designation of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism by the U.S. Department of State, coupled with the most severe tightening of the blockade in history, has cast a shadow over every facet of Cuban society, with direct consequences on the quality of life and human rights of our population:

- Infant mortality in Cuba rose from 4 per 1,000 live births in 2018 to 9.9 in 2025, representing a 148% increase.

- Of the 395 pharmaceuticals produced within the national basic health framework, 300 are currently unavailable, due to difficulties in accessing raw materials and pharmaceutical inputs.

- Difficulties persist in acquiring medical technology of U.S. origin or containing more than 10% U.S. components, requiring the use of intermediaries and a substantial increase in prices, often rendering them unaffordable for the Cuban economy.

- In oncology, the acquisition of a group of novel cancer-treatment drugs produced by U.S. pharmaceutical companies remains affected. These inaccessible medications include:

- Pemetrexed (Pharmaceutical: Lilly): Lung adenocarcinoma, Mesothelioma.
- Palbociclib (Pfizer) is employed in the management of hormone-responsive metastatic breast carcinoma.
- Brentuximab vedotin (Seattle Genetics) is utilized in refractory Hodgkin's lymphoma subsequent to transplantation.
- Pembrolizumab (MSD) and Nivolumab (Bristol Myers Squibb) constitute advanced immunotherapeutic agents for metastatic melanoma, pulmonary carcinoma, bladder carcinoma, and Hodgkin's lymphoma.

- Within the domains of gastroenterology and nephrology, access to advanced medical technologies is markedly constrained. Cuba is unable to procure digestive endoscopy towers manufactured by the Japanese company Olympus as they are priced ten times higher for Cuba than for other Latin American countries due to payment restrictions and sanction threats, while maintenance services for existing equipment are withheld. In nephrology, corporations such as Baxter Healthcare and distributors including Vitalmex Interamericana SA have declined to engage in commerce with Cuba, explicitly invoking the blockade as justification.

- With regard to cardiology and genetics services, vital equipment for children such as the HeartMate 3 and the PediMag and CentriMag cardiac pumps from Abbott, manufactured in the United States, remain out of reach for Cuban children. These devices make it possible to extend the lives of infants with severe heart conditions without the need for a transplant.

- During 2025, the study of 140 patients was compromised due to the shortage of Phytohemagglutinin, a reagent produced by the U.S. Company Sigma-Aldrich. This reagent is indispensable for conducting the postnatal karyotype laboratory test, which enables chromosomal analysis in neonates for the detection of congenital malformations and genetic syndromes.

- Cuba's special education sector continues to encounter significant challenges notwithstanding institutional efforts to provide support to students and their families. Although 259 children have received cochlear implants, 39 currently face functional limitations due to broken molds or lack of batteries.

- For five consecutive school years, only 2 of the 16 provincial audiometers have remained in service, leaving 297 children in special schools and 803 in mainstream classrooms without proper auditory stimulation.

- Regarding visual impairment, the deterioration of Perkins Braille machines has been documented, with 21 units deemed irreparable domestically. The national requirement totals 63 machines, and the current shortfall adversely affects 126 blind students—59 enrolled in special education schools and 67 integrated into regular classrooms

- Within the domain of special education for deaf and hard-of-hearing children, the situation is dire. María de los Ángeles Escalona Arias, Principal of the René Vilches Rojas special school, explains that the reinforced blockade has cut off access to behind-the-ear hearing aids and cochlear implants—devices her students depend on. Out of 65 children, 22 have received implants, yet the tightening of restrictions has sharply curtailed the chance of future surgeries.

- The construction sector has suffered a steep downturn. In 2025, the national cement industry recorded its second-lowest output since the triumph of the Revolution in 1959. This decline directly constrained the implementation of public infrastructure programs, which exhibited markedly reduced execution levels: the national road program achieved 43%, airport repair 58%, hydraulic resources 64%, and housing 53%.

- Havana's passenger transport system runs on barely more than 100 buses, despite a minimum requirement of 3,000 to ensure adequate service provision. Fuel allocations have been equally constrained: of the 40,000 tons designated for passenger transport in the preceding year, only 65% was effectively supplied. This scenario has led Cuban transport authorities to conclude that the present circumstances surpass in complexity those experienced during the most critical phase of the "Special Period" in the 1990s.

- Cuba's classification as a State Sponsor of Terrorism has prevented the participation of Cuban artists in cultural exchange initiatives sponsored by U.S. institutions. Documented cases include the suspension of collaborations with contemporary dance and physical theater companies based in New York and California, attributable to delays in securing OFAC authorization or to project cancellations arising from the inability to remunerate Cuban creators.

- Challenges have increased for investment and the acquisition of essential supplies for the national agricultural sector. For example, Cuba's rice program yielded only 1.9 t/ha in 2025. This represents a decline of 2.31 t/ha relative to the 4.21 t/ha recorded in 2018, prior to the intensification of the blockade.

The U.S. government has escalated its hostile rhetoric against Cuba, as a deliberate instrument of destabilization

In addition to the broad spectrum of measures reinforcing the economic, commercial, and financial blockade applied in the past year, the recurrent use of a highly threatening and confrontational narrative against Cuba has been added by top officials of the current U.S. administration.

President Donald Trump has stated that "*he would be honored to take Cuba*" while repeatedly warning Havana to strike a deal. Time and again, the U.S. President has suggested that Cuba is "next in line" on the White House agenda for regime change.

In the same vein, he publicly declared that he would position an aircraft carrier 100 yards off Cuba's coast, with the aim of intimidating the country and bringing down its political, economic, and social system. This statement stands as a stark threat of use of force and a violation of Cuba's sovereignty, since it envisions hostile naval forces intruding into territorial waters with openly offensive intent.

In January 2026, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio asserted before the Senate that he "*would like to see a regime change in Cuba*." His subsequent public interventions have consistently denied the existence of the blockade and sought to ascribe Cuba's difficulties to its government. Such discourse illustrates a pattern of dishonest and unscrupulous conduct.

With this objective, the powers that be in the United States have orchestrated a media campaign to establish and justify among the U.S. public the idea of direct military action against Cuba. Several U.S. news outlets have reported reconnaissance flights near Cuban shores and Pentagon efforts to refresh contingency plans for an eventual operation directed against Cuba.

In the same vein, in June 2026, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth visited the illegally occupied Guantánamo naval base and warned that the United States "*is prepared for any eventuality*" regarding Cuba.

These declarations occur within a context of unprecedented pressure and harm inflicted upon the Cuban population. All this is part of a deliberately structured, surgically calibrated, and broadly encompassing siege, which—arguably more explicitly than in previous decades—may foreshadow direct military aggression against Cuban territory.

On the other hand, between March 2025 and February 2026, the U.S. government unleashed and sustained a fierce campaign of slander and pressure aimed at ending Cuban medical cooperation in various countries. To this end, it resorted to extremely petty methods such as threatening to revoke U.S. visas for officials of third countries involved in formalizing cooperation agreements with Cuba.

These threats were no rhetoric. On June 3, 2025, the State Department announced entry visa restrictions to the United States for Central American government officials and their families, under the pretext of having ties with Cuban medical cooperation programs. On August 13, 2025, the U.S. Secretary of State announced similar visa restrictions for officials from several countries, as well as former officials of the Pan American Health Organization.

It is worth noting that the medical cooperation agreements signed by Cuban public health authorities with those of other States rest on legality and mutual benefit. They also embody a true model of South-South collaboration, consistent with international standards.

Expressions of rejection of the blockade and solidarity with Cuba recorded worldwide

The blockade represents a flagrant, large-scale, and systematic violation of human rights in Cuba, exacerbated by its recent intensification and the oil blockade. This was confirmed by the UN Human Rights Council's Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights, Alena Douhan, during her official visit to Cuba from November 11 to 21, 2025.

On May 11, 2026, the UN Secretary-General referred to U.S. coercive measures against Cuba and recalled the resolution presented by the Island at the General Assembly, which classified such sanctions as illegal and contrary to International Law. He also rejected any military approach and expressed his wish that the Cuban people would not continue to suffer dramatically, in reference to the reinforcement of the blockade.

More recently, in June 2026, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, warned that the expansion of U.S. sanctions against Cuba is causing widespread harm to the population and endangering lives, urging that such actions be halted.

He noted that "*fuel restrictions imposed since early 2026 and the recent tightening of extraterritorial sanctions together are directly harming the Cuban population, especially the most vulnerable*." He further stated that "*children are dying because doctors lack access to essential supplies and medicines*," and at another point remarked, "*Cuba is drowning under U.S. sanctions*."

Within the United States, significant support has been observed for lifting the blockade. Social movements, unions, community organizations, intellectuals, and broad sectors of civil society promoted letters, petitions, and campaigns that garnered massive endorsements. At local and legislative levels, municipal resolutions and statements by representatives questioned the policy of suffocation and called for an approach toward Cuba based on dialogue and respect for International Law. These expressions show that opposition to the blockade is no longer just global—it echoes within the very country that enforces it.

African nations have continued to demonstrate unwavering solidarity with Cuba. In February 2026, the African Union Assembly approved, for the seventeenth consecutive time, a resolution condemning the U.S. blockade against Cuba. The initiative also urged the removal of Cuba from the unilateral list of countries allegedly sponsoring terrorism, while expressing concern over the extraterritorial impact of the blockade, particularly through the application of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, rejection of the U.S. blockade against Cuba and solidarity with the Island were expressed forcefully and diversely throughout 2025 and early 2026. From the highest governmental levels—with recurrent statements by presidents Claudia Sheinbaum (Mexico), Luis Arce (Bolivia), Lula da Silva (Brazil), Gustavo Petro (Colombia), Gabriel Boric (Chile), Nicolás Maduro (Venezuela), Xiomara Castro (Honduras), and prime ministers Mia Mottley (Barbados), Gaston Browne (Antigua and Barbuda), John Briceño (Belize), and Dickon Mitchell (Grenada)—to legislative action in the form of parliamentary resolutions in Peru, Uruguay, Jamaica, and pronouncements by inter-parliamentary friendship groups with Cuba in countries such as Chile and Ecuador.

Asia and Oceania also witnessed official statements and social mobilizations. China and Vietnam, through their highest state and government bodies, demanded an end to coercive measures and rejected Cuba's punitive inclusion on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. In Australia, New Zealand, Japan, India, and Timor Leste, political parties, solidarity associations, and unions promoted signature campaigns and resolutions in support of Cuba.

In Europe, opposition to the blockade was equally significant. From formal appeals by Russia's State Duma and Federation Council to pronouncements within the European Parliament and widely supported motions in the United Kingdom, the message was clear: the blockade must end. Political bodies in France, Belgium, Ireland, Spain, Austria, Croatia, Poland, Belarus, and Luxembourg also issued statements or adopted initiatives underscoring the illegality and humanitarian impact of the blockade

These expressions of support were reflected in the overwhelming backing for Cuba's most recent resolution against the blockade, presented to the UN General Assembly on October 29, 2025, when 165 member states voted in favor of ending this outdated and criminal policy. It is worth highlighting that during the high-level debate of the 80th UNGA in September 2025, 43 leaders raised their voices to demand an end to the blockade, constituting one of the most salient items in the deliberations.

Globally, civil society played a central role in denouncing the blockade: solidarity organizations, friendship associations, medical networks, and NGOs organized signature drives, donations, and public actions to highlight the humanitarian impact of the siege on Cuba. For example, a letter to the U.S. president, initially signed by 515 intellectuals and artists at the initiative of the Mexican Chapter of the Network of Intellectuals and Artists in Defense of Humanity, eventually gathered more than 20,000 signatures.

Trade unions, guilds, and political youth groups in multiple countries adopted resolutions and organized demonstrations outside embassies, showing that protest against the blockade transcends diplomatic forums and reaches the streets and cities worldwide.

The “Nuestra América Convoy” was an emblematic manifestation of international solidarity with Cuba: delegations composed of numerous solidarity organizations, unions, student and cultural groups traveled to the Island to express in person their rejection of the blockade and to offer both material and symbolic support.

Despite the adverse circumstances described in this report, Cuba has not remained isolated. The vast majority of the international community, global political actors, civil society organizations, and prominent figures continue to express solidarity with the Island.

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The feat of the Cuban people in facing such a merciless siege will keep inspiring admiration across the globe. The Cuban people will prevail, for its resilience, creativity, and determination cannot be blocked in any way.

Annex: Quantitative assessment of sectoral impacts of the blockade in Cuba, March 1, 2025 – February 28, 2026

Health: economic damages amounted to **367,303,500 USD**

Education: during the period under review the Cuban Ministry of Education reported losses amounting to **73,799,500 USD**. The Ministry of Higher Education on the other hand, reported damages amounting to **24,207,000 USD**

Food production: agricultural business groups reported losses due to the blockade amounting to **848,088,919 USD**

Sports: damages reported totaled **36,271,620 USD**

Culture: losses in this sector amounted to **435,523,400 USD**

Biotechnology: the Cuban Biotechnological and Pharmaceutical Industries Group (BIOCUBAFARMA) reported losses due to the blockade amounting to **134,378,690 USD**

Tourism: damages were estimated at **2,093,914,700 USD**

Electro-energy sector: losses recorded in this area amounted to **802,352,780 USD**

Telecommunications: losses recorded in this area amounted to **135,427,300 USD**

Transport: losses totaled **202,010,740 USD**