Mr. Chairman,
We endorse the intervention made by Indonesia, on behalf of the NAM Group of Member States party to the NPT.
Cuba's position on nuclear weapons predates its status as a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which we ratified on November 4, 2002. Cuba does not possess, nor does it intend to possess, manufacture, trade or supply weapons of mass destruction of any kind. On the contrary, we advocate the prohibition and total elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and give this issue the highest priority.
This has been endorsed in the country's foreign policy principles, enshrined in our Constitution, which reaffirms that the country: “promotes general and complete disarmament and rejects the existence, proliferation or use of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction or other weapons with similar effects, as well as the development and use of new weapons and new ways of waging war, such as cyberwarfare, which transgress international law”.
Mr. Chairman,
We support the fundamental role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verifying compliance with the obligations of the NPT and the Safeguards Agreements, which the country strictly implements.
Upon acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Cuba immediately began negotiations with the IAEA to establish agreements that would allow for verification by that Agency of the nuclear activities carried out in the country, in accordance with the commitments assumed under paragraph 1 of Article III of the Treaty.
In 2007, in its report on the implementation of safeguards, the IAEA, for the first time, recognized Cuba among the 47 countries on which safeguards conclusions could be reached. This certification has been maintained every year since then.
Our country has faithfully complied with the non-proliferation objectives of the instrument. We reiterate that non- proliferation is not an end goal, in and of itself, but a step towards reaching nuclear disarmament. We regret that vertical proliferation continues, to the detriment of the credibility of the NPT. The selective and double-standards based approach that some countries try to impose when dealing with non-proliferation issues should not continue.
Mr. Chairman,
When acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Cuba registered a statement that reflects its position in relation to it. There, we stated that the NPT establishes a discriminatory international regime that favors the existence of a “club of nuclear weapon states”.
Despite the years that have passed since the Treaty entered into force on March 5, 1970, this situation persists and we are no closer to a world free of nuclear weapons, with more than 12,000 warheads in existence, of which almost 10,000 are in arsenals, ready for their potential use.
There is no justification for non-nuclear-weapon States to continue to be subjected to increasingly invasive verification regimes and to fully comply with their obligations in this regard, while the nuclear-weapon States Parties have not taken concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament.
We reject attempts to manipulate safeguards for geopolitical purposes and interests, which may jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the Agency. Safeguards activities being the exclusive competence of the IAEA, we reject decisions that have involved the Security Council in their consideration.
We call on all member states to reject any undue pressure or interference in the activities of the IAEA, especially in its verification process. Any attempt to go beyond the existing consensus on the additional protocol in a manner inconsistent with the Treaty or the voluntary nature of the additional protocol would be wrong from a legal point of view. Consequently, it is counterproductive to urge that the additional protocol be considered the verification standard for the Treaty.
The application of safeguards should not affect the inalienable rights derived from article IV of the Treaty or hinder the economic or technical development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear materials and equipment for the development of research, production and use of nuclear materials, without discrimination.
The hindering of legitimate programs for the peaceful use of nuclear energy not only contravenes the spirit and letter of the NPT, but also impedes the full and effective implementation of the mandate given to the IAEA.
I thank you