By Pedro Pablo Rodríguez
The death of José Martí on May 19, 1895 was, without a doubt, a tragedy for the Revolution of '95: When he fell from his horse, struck down by enemy bullets, the undisputed leader of the Cuban emigrations organized in the Party was lost. Cuban Revolutionary, who knew how to gain the trust of the patriots residing on the Island.
That was an irreparable loss, precisely at the beginning of the struggle for independence, when, in his capacity as Delegate of the PRC, he was preparing, together with Máximo Gómez, to move to Camagüey and there form the leadership of the revolution within Cuba until the expulsion from the Spanish metropolis. The process towards independence and the new republic to contribute to the balance of the world was already underway and was gaining strength by the day, but it was essential to give it shape, to organize it from the war march.
Such lofty and complex objectives that went beyond the limits of our coasts required his presence, his unifying capacity and his sensible and brilliant reasoning, backed by the feat of bringing together the emigrants, who followed his leadership from the PRC, and by having known how to involve a vast majority of the main military leaders of the Ten Years' War.
The Latin American intellectuals who had read him and, in more than one case, had had personal or correspondence contact with him, tended to object to his presence on the battlefield because they did not consider him a man of arms. Such an estimate has remained in place to this day and there are many people who wonder why Martí insisted on participating in that fateful meeting in Dos Ríos. This type of concern seems to be based on opinions based on false bases such as that he did not know how to ride a horse or that he also had no knowledge of the use of firearms. However, the worst explanation, because it is the most absurd, is the one that keeps repeating that the Master consciously sought death, that he committed suicide. Only those who have not understood Martí's character and personality can affirm such an opinion.
All those who dealt with Martí long before have reiterated, on the one hand, that even in the most difficult moments of the patriotic bustle he did not allow himself to be crushed by the difficulties. It is enough to appreciate his reaction to the Fernandina disaster, when, in all probability due to treason, the US authorities confiscated the weapons and the three ships that were supposed to bring the military leaders and war supplies to Cuba to support the uprising. in various parts of the Island according to the joint plans drawn up between Máximo Gómez and Martí. We know that this made the “lightning-fast” war impossible, in Martí's words.
Enrique Collazo, who in those days was with the PRC Delegate on behalf of the General in Chief, narrated Martí's reaction to that event that ruined everything. After a first and very logical moment of despair, in which Martí repeated that he was not responsible for what happened, that same day he recovered and began to devise plans and make decisions to put them into practice in order to continue with the insurrectional preparations. . His main friends in the emigrations and even the conspirators on the Island were surprised by the magnitude of the organizational effort deployed with absolute discretion by the Delegate and with renewed enthusiasm they continued with the war preparations. Thus, Martí's prestige was increased in that sad moment when he forced the agreed plans to be adjusted.
How, then, to think that Martí was a man who would allow himself to be crushed by difficulties, that he was going to foolishly give up his life, so necessary already in Cuba, in those initial moments of that, his war, prepared by him detail by detail, with exquisite care? He knew perfectly well that along with the armed encounters it was necessary to establish how that fight was going to be conducted, the ways in which the patriots in arms would organize themselves, especially when in the meeting with Maceo at the La Mejorana farm he had disagreed with the yours and Gómez's opinion.
Martí was always a student of the Ten Years' War. During his stay in Guatemala, in the midst of the conflict in Cuba, he prepared numerous notes for a history of that epic. And it is enough to read his speeches in New York on the anniversaries of October 10, along with his abundant writings in the newspaper Patria to understand how much he studied that war in order to explain his failure and avoid the mistakes that led thereto. That was the fundamental reason for his presence in Cuba starting in April 1895, a presence of whose necessity he had convinced Gómez, who at first was in favor of Martí remaining in New York at the head of the PRC and organizing support for the combatants in Cuba.
There is no real element that allows us to affirm that Martí was preparing to leave Cuba. No serious historian who has studied Martí's last days has been able to affirm such nonsense. Recording the pages of his diary and his letters from that time, as well as the diary of the General in Chief, demonstrates absolutely the opposite. Could it be a suicide who, the day before his death, had begun a letter to his Mexican friend Manuel Mercado in which he revealed with total clarity the deep historical and geopolitical objectives that motivated him? Who had such plans could have the absurd and cowardly vocation of giving his life away? Was Martí so irresponsible that he consciously led Ángel de la Guardia, his young companion on May 19, to the death?
The entire life of the Master, especially since he became the organizer of the Revolution of '95, is a lie to such an appreciation. He had to arrive in Camagüey to create the political-military leadership apparatus of that struggle. Could he avoid such responsibility?
Was he going to give up his life for nothing, the one who moments before the first shots had spoken to those troops and had raised their patriotic fervor? And why would he give her away? What reasons could lead him to this?
On the other hand, it is understandable that Martí insisted on participating in the combat. In addition to the old idea of someone who wanted to come to the Ten Years' War on a failed expedition from Mexico and as the main figure in the preparations for the Little War until he was arrested and deported for the second time to Spain, which prevented him from taking up arms, Martí had to demonstrate to that mambisa troop that had applauded him with fervor moments before that he was not a spider captain who called others to combat while he took shelter in the camp.
In the Cuban wars, the leaders always marched at the front of their troops and that is why so many died in combat. Was Martí, the Delegate, recently appointed major general by the General-in-Chief days ago, going to be oblivious to his first possibility of fighting against the enemy? This would have been irresponsible and many might have even considered it cowardice. And Martí was not of that race nor was he going to allow others to think so. His personal honor, his sense of duty for having called for war, his debt since 1868, his responsibility for the leadership he held and was recognized given his functions, led him to make the decision to participate in that fight, to have his baptism of fire, sadly the first and the last.
We certainly lost him at a time when it was essential, but let us ask ourselves if someone with such moral height and sense of duty could have made a different decision.
In the beautiful Cuban history for the free and sovereign homeland, the leaders have always fought at the front of their people. Those back then did so; Those who have continued them since the 20th century have repeated that behavior. Being a leader in Cuba means taking all risks, even those of war for the homeland. And that is, without a doubt, a Marti tradition.