May, 2025
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
The US blockade against Cuba in figures
Introduction
1. Persistence and tightening of the blockade policy
1.1 Effective implementation of the blockade laws.
1.2 Impact of Cuba's inclusion in the US State Department unilateral
List of States that allegedly sponsor terrorism.
2. The blockade violates the rights of the Cuban people
2.1 Impacts on highly sensitive sectors.
2.2 Impacts on economic development, trade, and finances
2.3 Impacts on the emerging sectors of the Cuban economy
3. The blockade is a violation of International Law. Extraterritorial
implementation of the blockade.
4. Universal rejection of the blockade.
Conclusions
Annex 1: US blockade laws and regulations
Annex 2: Blockade measures adopted by the US government
between March, 2024 and February, 2025.
Annex 3: Prerogatives of the US President to modify the
implementation of the blockade against Cuba.
Annex 4: Some examples of the extraterritorial implementation of
the blockade against Cuba between March, 2024 and
February, 2025.
Annex 5: Actions denouncing the blockade against Cuba between
March, 2024 and May, 2025.
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The US blockade against Cuba in figures
The cost of 4 months of blockade is equivalent to the financing required to purchase the
buses needed by the public transportation system in the country (USD 2,850,000,000).
The cost of 2 months of blockade is equivalent to the cost of the fuel needed to meet the
country's regular power demand (USD 1,600,000,000).
The cost of 2 months of blockade is equivalent to the financing needed to guarantee the
delivery of the rationed family food basket to the population during one year (around USD
1,600,000,000).
The cost of 16 days of blockade is equivalent to the financing required to meet the needs of
the country's National List of Essential Medicines (around USD 339,000,000).
The cost of 14 days of blockade is equivalent to the financing required to increase the share
of renewable energy sources in the country's energy matrix from 24 per cent to 26 per cent
(around USD 300,000,000).
The cost of 12 days of blockade is equivalent to the annual financing required for the
maintenance of the National Power Generation System (around USD 250,000,000, excluding
fuel and investments costs).
The cost of 6 days of blockade is equivalent to the financing required to import medical
consumables (cotton, gauze, syringes, needles, sutures, catheters, IV equipment, among
others) and the reagents needed by the national health system during one year (around USD
129,000,000).
The cost of 2 days of blockade is equivalent to the cost of annual maintenance required by
public transportation in the country (USD 40,000,000).
The cost of 21 hours of blockade is equivalent to the financing required to replace
deteriorated and obsolete technological resources in the country's educational institutions
(USD 18,133,050).
The cost of 14 hours of blockade is equivalent to the cost of purchasing the insulin needed
to meet the country's demand during one year (USD 12,000,000).
The cost of 5 hours of blockade is equivalent to the cost of purchasing toys and teaching
aids needed in all daycare centers of the country (around USD 4,500,000).
The cost of 2 hours of blockade is equivalent to the purchase cost of medications used for
the treatment of psychiatric, neurological, and heart conditions, as well as food for children with
genetic deficiencies and endocrine metabolic diseases (around USD 1,400,000).
The cost of 19 minutes of blockade is equivalent to the cost of the electric and conventional
wheelchairs required to meet the needs of the country's special education system (USD
280,506).
The cost of 17 minutes of blockade is equivalent to the purchase cost of the medication
Nusinersen for the annual treatment of infantile spinal atrophy (USD 250,000).
The cost of 10 minutes of blockade is equivalent to the financing needed to cover the
demand of hearing aids for children and teenagers with disabilities who are enrolled in the
country’s special education system (USD 142,966.82).
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Introduction
The main goal pursued by the US government, which is to overthrow the
Cuban Revolutionary Government, has not changed. The economic,
commercial, and financial blockade is the main pillar of its policy of
maximum pressure against the Island, which is intended to suffocate its
economy, generate shortages and discontent in order to provoke a social
outbreak that would lead to a change in the constitutional order legitimately
established by the Cuban people in the exercise of their self-determination.
Nothing better illustrates the criminal nature of the US government's
blockade against Cuba, which is contrary to International Law, than the
internal memorandum drafted by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Lester Mallory, dated April 6, 1960:
“(...) every possible means should be undertaken promptly to
weaken the economic life of Cuba (...) a line of action which, while
as adroit and inconspicuous as possible, makes the greatest inroads
in denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and
real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of
government.”
President Donald Trump's policy of economic and financial harassment
seeks to satisfy his political commitments to the anti-Cuban far right and
ignores the majority support of US public opinion, the international
community and Cuban émigrés in that country in favor of lifting the
blockade and normalizing relations between the two countries.
Representatives of the current US administration have acknowledged that
their goal is to refine the design of the maximum pressure policy to make
it more effective in terms of damaging the Cuban economy and people.
They have stated that they will be more creative in identifying and
attempting to cut off Cuba's external sources of income, with the open goal
of attempting to cause the collapse of the Cuban economy.
Between March, 2024 and February, 2025, the US administration
rigorously applied the laws and practices of the blockade, with actions
aimed at identifying, persecuting and eliminating, in a surgical and
systematic manner, the main sources of income of the Cuban economy.
The most severe measures were Cuba's permanence in the unilateral list
of countries allegedly sponsoring terrorism; its new inclusion in the list of
countries that do not fully cooperate with the US government's
counterterrorism efforts; the possibility of filing lawsuits in US courts under
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Title III of the Helms-Burton Act1; sanctions or threats against shipping
companies, carriers, insurers or reinsurers involved in supplying fuel to
Cuba; the persecution of Cuban financial transactions for the supply of
essential resources; as well as Cuba’s inclusion in other unilateral listings.
The US government has further improved a coercive strategy that
includes, among other measures, the persecution of international medical
cooperation agreements offered by Cuba and the offensive against
tourism traveling to the country. Added to this are the ongoing
disinformation and manipulation operations on digital platforms,
orchestrated and financed from the US, to present a distorted image of
Cuba’s reality, portraying a country on the brink of collapse and a people
at odds with their government.
Joined by anti-Cuban politicians, that country’s authorities have cynically
insisted that the difficulties experienced by the Cuban economy were the
result of the implementation of a socialist model and the mistakes made
by the government, in an attempt to hide the negative impact of the
blockade on all areas of the country's economic and social life, as well as
the obvious responsibility of the US government in this regard.
While all the shortages and problems faced by the Cuban people are not
exclusively due to the US government's blockade and its cumulative
effects, those who deny that this policy represents the main obstacle to
Cuba's development, or ignore the fact that, without the blockade, all these
problems would be solved more quickly, would be lying.
The blockade against Cuba is the longest-lasting and most comprehensive
and complex system of unilateral coercive measures ever imposed against
any country in history. This reality is undeniable.
From March 1, 2024, to February 28, 2025, the material damages and
losses caused by the blockade to Cuba were estimated at USD
7,556,100,000, which represents a 49 per cent increase as compared to
the previous period.
This increase is a direct consequence of the tightening of the policy of
suffocation and financial persecution against Cuba, with actions surgically
designed against our country, aimed at undermining the economy,
affecting strategic sectors for our development, hindering international
trade activity and preventing the arrival of essential supplies for the
population.
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Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act
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It is mainly due to the increased impact of incomes foregone from exports
of goods and services, estimated at around USD 2,608,000,000; and the
geographical relocation of trade amounting to USD 1,212,700,000.
Another factor that has contributed to such a high impact has been the US
government's policy of promoting and encouraging the emigration of
Cuban professionals and technicians, whose explicit purpose is, on the
one hand, to provoke a migration crisis to justify its hostility against Cuba
and, on the other, to deprive the country of part of its workforce, most of
which is made up by highly skilled professionals.
In this regard, damages to the Cuban economy are estimated at USD
2,570,400,000. This has been calculated based on the significant amount
of resources allocated to the training of these personnel, since education
in Cuba is public and free and the Cuban government subsidizes this
sector, to which it has allocated 23 per cent of the State budget in 2025.
Likewise, the absence of these professionals and technicians has a direct
impact on the country's ability to maintain normal economic development
rates, whether in production, services, or any other activity. It also affects
innovation capability, technological development and generational
renewal in strategic sectors.
These increases show that the blockade is real and has been tightened to
unprecedented levels in recent years. The blockade is the main obstacle
to the country's development.
All of that represents an impact of more than USD 629,675,000 per
month, over USD 20,701,644 per day and more than USD 862,568 per
hour of blockade.
At current prices, the cumulative damage resulting from the
implementation of this policy for over six decades amounts to USD
170,677,200,000. Taking into account the value of the dollar against the
price of gold at the international market, the blockade has caused
quantifiable damages estimated at USD 2,103,897,000,000.
It has been estimated that, without the blockade, Cuba's GDP, at current
prices, could have grown by around 9.2 per cent in 2024. These figures
speak volumes about the damage caused by the blockade. The Cuban
government could have implemented many more social programs and
promoted development projects had it had access to these resources.
There is not a single sector of Cuba’s social and economic life that
escapes the effects of the blockade. The majority of the Cuban population
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has been born and lived under the constant siege of this criminal policy,
which directly affects their well-being, quality of life and rights.
This report shows the extent of this grave injustice, even though the full
impact of this criminal policy will never be fully quantified.
Persistence and tightening of the blockade policy
Effective implementation of the blockade laws
Ignoring the unequivocal position of the international community,
expressed in successive resolutions of the UN General Assembly, the US
government continues to rigorously enforce the laws that make up the
complex framework of the blockade against Cuba. These laws are listed
in Annex 1 of this Report. Annex 2 describes the main legal and regulatory
actions taken to enforce the blockade between March, 2024 and February,
2025.
The so-called Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, known as the
“Helms-Burton Act,” codified the provisions of the blockade with the
intention of depriving the US government of the ability to relax its
suffocation policy against Cuba. This law, contrary to the US Constitution
itself and the norms and principles of International Law, removes from the
US President the power to lift the blockade, a prerogative that falls to the
US Congress. However, it grants the President broad powers to modify its
implementation through licenses and executive actions, which are
described in Annex 3.
Just six days before the end of his term, on January 14, 2025, President
Joe Biden exercised those prerogatives by removing Cuba from the US
State Department's list of countries that allegedly sponsor terrorism;
suspending the implementation of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act;
repealing the Presidential National Security Memorandum No. 5 of June
2017 and eliminating the list of restricted Cuban entities. This decision was
a belated and limited correction of several aspects of this cruel and unjust
policy.
However, some of these measures were reversed by President Donald
Trump on his first day in office by signing the Executive Order “Initial
Rescissions of Harmful Executive Orders and Actions” on January 20,
2025. This led to the new inclusion of Cuba in the list of countries allegedly
sponsoring terrorism, which showed the highly politicized nature of these
unilateral lists and the fact that that they are not based on evidence, but
on the murky dealings of US politics.
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Subsequently, and in accordance with Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, US
courts were allowed to hear lawsuits against individuals or companies
linked to nationalized properties, with the aim of internationalizing
economic pressure and deterring foreign direct investments in Cuba. This
possibility had been suspended by all previous US presidents since 1996,
by virtue of a prerogative provided for by the law itself. At the end of March,
2025, 45 lawsuits had been filed under Title III -30 of them are still ongoing
litigations. The main areas that have been targeted by this US
congressional legislation are tourism, shipping, mining, construction, fuel
supply and distribution, airlines and agriculture.
As part of its policy of maximum pressure, in February, 2025, the US
government rejected dozens of Cuban passports and did not grant visas
that had been processed by Cuban government agencies. This decision
directly affects bilateral exchanges in areas of mutual interest and benefit
for the peoples of Cuba and the US, such as culture, health, education,
science and sports, thus politicizing the natural relationship between
neighboring peoples.
The reissue of Presidential Memorandum No. 5 on June 30, 2025, by the
US government confirms the policy of maximum economic pressure as a
criminal and illegal tool to pursue hegemonic objectives and regime
change in Cuba. It reinforces the aggression and economic blockade
imposed by the US government. The current text, like the original dated
June 2017, provides a platform to further improve the mechanisms of
economic and political coercion against the country and against third
countries having ties with Cuba.
Statements by representatives of the US government, including its
Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, and anti-Cuban congress members,
have confirmed the intention to cut off all possible sources of external
income for Cuba; damage tourism and travel by US citizens and citizens
from other countries; sabotage international medical cooperation; hinder
fuel supplies; obstruct the inflow of family remittances; scare away foreign
direct investments and hamper trade; and torpedo Cuba's economic and
cooperative relations with third countries or blocs made up by these
countries. The new document adds up to the corpus of coercive measures
against Cuba that already existed through well-known laws and
regulations.
No other nation has been faced with such a long-lasting, anachronistic,
systematic and extreme framework of aggressive and coercive laws and
policies.
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Impacts of Cuba's inclusion in the US State Department unilateral
List of States that allegedly sponsor terrorism
The arbitrary and unjustifiable inclusion of Cuba in this list, while
reinforcing its deterrent and intimidating effects on third parties in their
commercial relations with Cuba, has increased the Country Risk; caused
serious difficulties for our operations in the banking and financial sector,
international trade, access to financing, fuel purchase, access to the
suppliers of goods and inputs that are essential for economic
development; and discouraged foreign investments.
Dozens of banks suspended their operations with Cuba, including
transfers for the purchase of food, medicines, fuel, materials, spare parts
for the national power system, and other essential goods. The Cuban
economy lost its traditional suppliers. Due to the Country Risk and the
inability to access faster and more expeditious logistics routes, additional
costs had to be incurred into to acquire these inputs.
Numerous Cuban diplomatic missions have faced difficulties due to foreign
banks refusal to provide them with financial services, thus hindering their
normal functioning. This also hampered and, in some cases, prevented
Cuba from honoring its financial obligations to international and regional
bodies.
Travel and tourism to Cuba, one of the country's main sources of income,
have been severely penalized, since the visa waiver program through the
ESTA2 system is not valid for people who have visited Cuba. This is due
to the continued enforcement of the US “Visa Waiver Program
Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015,” which
arbitrarily designates Cuba as a State sponsor of terrorism.
In addition to that, anti-Cuban sectors in the US government and Congress
manipulate Cuba's continued permanence in that list to impose the false
narrative that the Island constitutes a threat to US security, justify their
hostility and expand the punitive legal basis against our country. This
pretext has been used by the current US administration to impose
restrictions to official bilateral cooperation, people-to-people exchanges,
travel by Cubans to the US and scientific cooperation.
The blockade violates the rights of the Cuban people
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Electronic System for Travel Authorization. It is part of the US Visa Waiver Program, which allows citizens of
countries participating in the program to enter the US for tourism, business, or transit purposes and remain in
the country for a maximum period of 90 days
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The economic, commercial, and financial blockade imposed by the US
government against Cuba is an act of genocide and a massive, flagrant,
and systematic violation of the human rights of the entire Cuban people. It
directly and indiscriminately affects their enjoyment of these rights, as well
as national efforts to protect them. The express purpose of generating
misery, hunger and despair confirms its criminal and inhumane nature.
The unprecedented tightening of the blockade in recent years has had a
particular impact on the public health sector. The tense situation created
in our economy, the financial persecution of Cuba and the denial of access
to the US market to acquire technologies, medicines, and medical devices
have hampered the ability of our health system to obtain these supplies
when needed and provide quality service to the population. This has, in
turn, led to the deterioration of several health indicators, including those
related to mortality.
Impacts on highly sensitive sectors
The blockade has a real and permanent impact on the health sector,
affecting the free, universal, and quality medical care that has always been
guaranteed to the Cuban people.
The cancellation of contracts; the refusal of shipping companies to
transport cargo to Cuba; the impossibility of using products and
technologies containing more than 10 per cent of US components,
together with increased costs and the persecution of income sources have
seriously hampered the acquisition of essential supplies. This not only
harms basic health care for the population, but also has a debilitating effect
on the medical personnel, institutions and families, thus impacting
essential services, which are currently limited.
Within the period between March, 2024 and February, 2025, this policy
caused losses estimated at USD 288,833,610 to this sector.
The National List of Essential Medicines in Cuba includes 651 items, 250
of which are imported and 401 are produced locally, but 69 per cent of
them have been impacted by the blockade. Of this big total, 364 medicines
are in short supply, representing 56 per cent of the total.
Due to the blockade, Cuba cannot normally access advanced US manufactured technologies and medicines, or medical equipment in which
more than 10 per cent of components are made in the US. Instead, it
should do so through third markets at much higher prices. Here are some
examples:
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- Percutaneous aortic prostheses, such as the Edwards-SAPIEN or
CoreValve valves to treat heart diseases, especially in persons of
advanced age. These valves allow patients suffering from severe
valve stenosis to undergo surgery without having to resort to highly
complex procedures. Aortic stenosis is a degenerative disease and
is prevalent among adults over 65 years of age. Approximately 30
per cent of these patients cannot undergo surgery due to
contraindications associated with co-morbidities. With this device,
158,800 patients could be treated without the need to resort to a
complex surgery.
- Pacemakers manufactured by the company Medtronic, as well as
pacemaker lead extraction equipment. Given this restriction,
conventional cardiovascular surgery has had to be used, despite the
complications this procedure entails. During this period, it was not
possible to implant permanent pacemakers on 375 patients.
- Cardiac stimulation devices (implantable cardioverter-defibrillators).
The companies that used to sell these devices to Cuba have
increased the percentage of US-manufactured parts. Several Cuban
patients suffering from hypertrophic cardiomyopathy have been
waiting for several months for an implantable cardioverterdefibrillator, which they have been unable to obtain due to the
consequences of the blockade.
- Non-fluoroscopic mapping equipment manufactured in the United
States and used to treat atrial fibrillation and complex arrhythmias,
such as ventricular tachycardia. Approximately 45,000 people in the
country suffer from these conditions. Not a single case has been
operated on since 2020. These patients have had to be treated
solely with medications. There is only one piece of such equipment
in the country, which is out of service due to the impossibility of
providing the corresponding maintenance.
- Oncological medicines such as Pemetrexed, for lung cancer;
Palbociclib, for breast cancer; and Brentuximab vedotin, for posttransplant refractory Hodgkin's lymphoma.
- First- and second-line medicines for the treatment of lung and colon
cancers and sarcomas, such as Pembrolizumab, manufactured by
the pharmaceutical company Merck Sharp and Dohme; and
Nivolumab, manufactured by the pharmaceutical company Bristol
Myers Squibb. Something similar occurs with pediatric cancer
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treatments, such as the medicine Lomustine, used for the treatment
of brain and bone marrow tumors.
- Reagents necessary for the accurate diagnosis of patients suffering
from neuroblastoma (a cancerous tumor that grows from nerve
tissue). Chromosomal studies are required to determine the risk
group to which the patient belongs and define the appropriate
treatment. The blockade prevents access to these reagents in the
US market.
- Advanced technology equipment, such as the Philips ultrasound
equipment card, which is important for cardiovascular, obstetric, and
gynecological treatments; bronchoscopy, argon plasma, and
cryotherapy equipment to remove skin lesions; or endobronchial
prostheses.
- Advanced and highly effective biological therapies for patients
suffering from lupus and rheumatoid arthritis.
- Diagnostic technologies and tools indispensable for therapeutic
decisions when treating patients suffering from cancer, such as the
Oncotype DX Breast Cancer Test and Oncotype DX Colon Cancer
Test manufactured by the company Genomic Health, Inc.
- Microscopy equipment with reflective focus, to improve the
effectiveness of the diagnosis of skin cancer and other dermatoses.
- Endoscopic surgery equipment; consumables, such as silicone
drainage tubes and catheters; prostheses for erectile dysfunction
surgery; artificial sphincters for male urinary incontinence as well as
advanced medicines for the treatment of prostate cancer patients,
such as Abiraterone and Enzalutamide, which reduce mortality and
improve quality of life.
- First-line biological treatments for the control of Crohn's disease (a
chronic gastrointestinal condition) and ulcerative colitis
(inflammatory bowel disease). The impossibility to purchase these
treatments in the US market forces us to resort to more distant
markets, with the consequent increase in costs and the negative
impact on the number of patients to be treated.
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- Medical accessories for patient care in procedures applied to
examine the bile and pancreatic ducts and the treatment of portal
hypertension and esophageal tumors. These accessories are mainly
produced by US companies and cannot be purchased in that territory
due to the restrictive measures of the blockade.
- Circulatory assist devices for hemodynamically unstable patients,
the vast majority of which are manufactured in the United States.
- Continuous insulin infusion pumps for patients with type 1 diabetes,
as well as continuous glucose monitoring technology, manufactured
by the US company Abbott.
- Pediatric ventricular support systems, which are only manufactured
in the US, for the treatment of postoperative low cardiac output (a
common complication after heart surgery), which occurs in 15 per
cent of patients and becomes irreversible in a group of them, some
of whom could survive with these devices.
- Deep brain stimulation and invasive vagus nerve stimulation
devices, a therapeutic alternative for movement disorders and
epilepsy. These devices are mainly manufactured and marketed by
three US companies (Medtronic, Boston Scientific and Abbott).
- Medications for Parkinson's disease. The most effective of them is
Levodopa. Cuban patients do not have access to the US formulation
of this product, Sinemet, or to other important ones such as
Ropinirole, Pramipexole and Rotigotine.
- The drug Nusinersen for the treatment of infantile spinal atrophy. Its
effectiveness has been proven by keeping more than half of the
children suffering from this deadly disease alive. This medicine is
manufactured by the US company Biogen Inc., and is therefore not
available for Cuban patients.
- Drugs for the treatment of dementia in elderly patients, such as
Memantine, Donepezil and Rivastigmine; or insulin for the treatment
of diabetes mellitus in patients belonging to this age group.
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- We have been denied access to arterial prostheses manufactured
by US companies. This poses serious difficulties to the study and
treatment of peripheral vascular diseases, which impacts on the rate
of amputations.
The first cause of death in children under 1 year of age in 2024 in the
country was congenital malformations. Due to the restrictions imposed by
the blockade, there is a serious limitation of the resources necessary for
the prenatal and postnatal diagnosis of these, as well as for their
intrauterine treatment.
The difficulties in acquiring the medicines used to treat childhood
hematological cancers have forced us to modify first-line treatment
schemes that had allowed us to achieve survival rates of over 75 per cent.
Examples of these medicines are Lomustine and Methotrexate, used in
the treatment of osteosarcoma. Consequently, we must use second-line
and third-line drugs, which are less effective. Survival rates have therefore
been reduced to 60 per cent.
Surgery has been one of the most affected areas as a result of the
shortage of resources (medications, consumables and medical
equipment). Currently, 94,729 patients are on the waiting list for
undergoing. Of these, 9,913 are children who are treated by the specialties
of oncology, ophthalmology, general surgery, orthopedics, urology and
gynecology. Besides, 4,507 cancer patients are awaiting surgery.
Furthermore, it is still impossible to acquire US technology related to
robotics to perform surgeries. The US company Intuitive Surgical, which is
the only manufacturer of the Da Vinci Xi Robot, refuses to sell it to Cuba
as a result of the restrictions imposed by the blockade.
At the same time, the US firm Baxter Healthcare, the leading seller of
dialysis machines in Latin America, refuses to sell equipment to Cuba, as
do other similar companies such as the US firm Drake Whillock, which has
expressly cited the blockade as a repeated reason for not selling its
products to our country. This has affected nephrology services.
Refurbished dialysis machines are readily available in the US, but they are
not accessible to Cuba. The prices of these equipments represent
between one-third and one-quarter of the price of brand-new machines.
Cuban importer entities, which had to turn to Europe to purchase them,
could have obtained 54 refurbished machines in the US for the price of the
18 new ones that were purchased, which would have guaranteed care for
another 180 patients.
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The shortage of raw materials and financing, resulting from the impact of
the blockade, has made it difficult to access various types of drains;
mammary clips for myocardial revascularization and other basic
consumables and medications, such as catheters, diuretics,
anticoagulants and antihypertensive medicines. For this reason, 340
patients have not been able to undergo surgery during this period.
Surgeries for patients with cardiovascular conditions have been
significantly delayed due to a lack of oxygenators used during these
procedures, which has had a major impact on mortality and the worsening
of the condition for which these patients need to be operated on.
The lack of availability of technologies, which cannot be acquired for
having more than 10 per cent of their components manufactured in the
United States, hinders the diagnosis of genetic diseases in Cuba,
especially those affecting neurological development. Furthermore, we are
prevented from acquiring the technologies necessary for the mass
sequencing required for the diagnosis, treatment and prognosis of various
types of cancer, such as breast cancer, which has an impact on mortality
from this disease and limits the effectiveness of cancer treatments.
Likewise, Osvaldo Enrique Fumero, a patient diagnosed with an
abdominal aortic aneurysm, is awaiting surgery that could cause him to
die if it is not performed. The surgery has been postponed while efforts
continue to be made to acquire the necessary arterial prosthesis, which is
sourced from the United States.
In June 2024, a supplier of the Cuban company Medicuba had to apply for
a license from OFAC to export cobalt equipment, air compressors and
spare parts used in the treatment of cancer patients to the country. As part
of the US government's genocidal policy, one year has elapsed since the
request was made and no response has yet been received from OFAC.
This has made it impossible for these essential resources to enter the
country, which has delayed the timely application of treatments to cancer
patients and prevented those with advanced stages of the disease from
enjoying a better quality of life.
The siege imposed against Cuba also affects the assisted reproduction
services offered by the Cuban public health system. The purchase of
consumables, medicines, reagents, and embryo culture media is
hampered, which prevents us from performing the number of in vitro
fertilization cycles needed to meet the needs of our patients. Lidia Rosalea
de la Fuente Pérez and Mijaíl Chacón de Armas are one of many Cuban
couples who have been unable to fulfill the dream to conceive a child,
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since the procedures they must undergo, despite the efforts made by our
health system, have been slowed down for not having timely access to
these resources.
The US National Institutes of Health (NIH) has banned scientists from
Cuba and five other “countries of concern” from accessing 21 biomedical
databases containing information on genetic variation, cancer cases,
neurodegenerative diseases and other data. The decision, made on April
2 by the Trump administration, which further strengthens a long-term effort
to prevent foreign access to data considered sensitive, also puts a halt on
projects involving databases that include collaborators in the
aforementioned countries.
The blockade affects not only the Cuban people, but also the American
people themselves. The LABIOFAM S.A. Business Group continues to
export VIDATOX 30CH, a homeopathic product used as a complementary
therapy against cancer, to various countries around the world, where it has
been very well received. The US ranks third in cancer incidence (in
absolute terms for both sexes)3. The cost of individual treatments in that
country can exceed USD 100,000 per year. If the blockade did not exist,
US patients could have access to this product, thus generating an
estimated USD 1,400,000 in revenues for Cuba.
This kind of siege does not allow other Cuban products, such as
Heberprot-P, which has proven effective in the treatment of diabetic foot
ulcers, to be used on US patients. This medicine reduces the number of
amputations due to this disease, with a direct impact on the health
standards of any country. It has been estimated that more than 1,000,000
US citizens are diagnosed with this disease every year, of whom around
500,000 develop complex ulcers that could be treated with Heberprot-P if
the blockade did not exist.
Besides, US companies have expressed interest in acquiring the Cuban
medicine Proctokinasa for the treatment of acute hemorrhoidal disease. It
has been estimated that 10,000,000 US citizens suffer from this disease
every year and that, of these, 1,500,000 require surgery. If the blockade
did not exist, this medicine could benefit these patients, thus avoiding
invasive procedures such as thrombectomy.
And as if that were not enough, the US government also persecutes
Cuba's international medical cooperation, based on arbitrary and
unfounded allegations of human trafficking. By resorting to such slanders,
3
Ferlay J, Ervik M, Lam F, Laversanne M, Colombet M, Mery L, Piñeros M, Znaor A, Soerjomataram I,
Bray F (2024). Global Cancer Observatory: Cancer Today (version 1.1). Lyon, France: International
Agency for Research on Cancer. Available from: https://gco.iarc.who.int/today
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they seek to delegitimize this honorable and altruistic work and hinder the
inflow of legitimate resources in those cases where cooperation is offered
in the form of “compensated technical assistance,” under plans backed by
the UN, which are fully compliant with the international standards
governing South-South cooperation.
Harassment by US officials in various countries against Cuban medical
brigades, aid workers, as well as ministers and health authorities of those
nations, has increased significantly. The persecution of international
medical cooperation agreements, among others, is part of a coercive
strategy aimed at preventing the inflow of indispensable income to meet
the growing needs of the population, which resulted in an estimated loss
of USD 3,249,838.
The economic siege that prevents access to foreign currency, supplies,
raw materials, fertilizers, machinery, fuels, chemicals and technology has
also led to a significant decrease in food production. Furthermore, the
impossibility to hire a significant number of shipping companies has
interrupted the arrival to the country of supplies that have already been
paid for.
All of this has led to a shortage of agricultural machinery, insufficient feed
for livestock and a deficit of spare parts for equipment and industry, thus
hindering the agricultural system's capacity to meet the demand, both in
the domestic market and in foreign trade. From March 2024 to February
2025, the impact on this sector amounted to USD 51,981,900.
The main impacts on this sector are outlined below:
During this period, wholesale supplies were insufficient and the
deficit of products in the retail market persisted, together with an
unstable supply of the basic items of the rationed family basket and
fragmented deliveries to the population. In 2024, the planned
distribution of several products to the population could not be met,
with a marked decrease as compared to 2023 in products such as
beans, sugar, coffee, oil, powdered milk, soy yogurt, meat products,
chicken, beef, and domestic fuels (coal and natural gas), as well as
medically prescribed diets, with priority given to children suffering
from chronic diseases and pregnant women. The shortage of
financing resulting from the attack on the sources of income of the
Cuban economy and the late arrival of imported raw materials has
severely impacted on this situation.
The deficit in hard currency financing; the decline in exports and the
marked financial persecution resulting from the impact of the
17
blockade have affected the availability of essential sources of raw
materials, including agricultural products, milk, fruit for the canning
industry, beef and pork, as well as imports such as powdered milk
and wheat, which are essential to meet the needs of the population.
It becomes increasingly difficult to hire ships to transport wheat to
the country, despite having the necessary financing. This has
significantly affected the production cycle of bread destined for the
population’s daily consumption.
The country needs 1,800 tons of powdered milk per month to ensure
coverage for children, medically prescribed diets and pregnant
women, only as part of the basic food basket. The cost of this
amounts to USD 8,500,000 per month. Although food supplies for
children aged zero to two years –considered a priority age grouphas been guaranteed, it has not been possible to guarantee
powdered milk for children aged two to six years in the provinces
that receive this product.
One ton of cooking oil costs approximately USD 1,829; thus, it is
necessary to spend USD 4,000,000 per month to supply this product
to the entire Cuban population. For five months during the period
under review, it became impossible to guarantee cooking oil
deliveries.
The meat products company Bravo S.A. recorded losses estimated
at USD 905,900 because it was unable to purchase raw materials in
the US market. With this amount, the company could have
purchased 1,500 tons more of meat raw materials and produced
2,800 tons of finished product.
The National Center for Plant and Animal Health (CENSA) cannot
purchase raw materials, supplies, and materials for the production
of vaccines, medicines, and other veterinary products, nor can it
market Cuban vaccines in the US market or in third countries with
US investment.
Medicines intended to ensure avian health could not be purchased
in time, which caused losses in the animal stock. In addition to that,
poultry equipment, which could have increased the capacity to breed
poultry for human consumption, could no longer be imported.
18
Due to the lack of financing caused by the blockade, approximately
337,000 tons of corn and 120,300 tons of soybeans for feed
production could not be purchased. As a result of that, egg
production destined to be distributed as part of the rationed family
basket was not met.
Should the blockade not exist, Cuba would be able to acquire the
best poultry genetics available in the US and the production of fresh
eggs for domestic consumption and even a surplus for export could
be boosted. This is a strategy that is also affected by the shortage of
food and the need for updated technology.
Pork production in 2024 experienced a notable decline –it only
reached 53 per cent of the production levels achieved in 2023. The
inability to import food and inputs to ensure biosafety in pig farms
affected the supply of pork to the industry, thus causing shortages of
this product and an increase in the prices of pork and pork products.
The restrictive measures imposed by the US government prevent
Cuban rum and tobacco from being sold in the US market. The
losses incurred as a result of that have been estimated at USD
19,511,100. This amount could have been used to purchase food
and medicines and improve industrial and social infrastructure.
The main impacts on the acquisition of commodities are related to noncompliance with import plans due to lack of financing for payments;
insufficient access to credits; increase in the prices of products and
services; increase in freight costs and delayed arrivals of goods.
Although there are some exceptions to the blockade, such as the limited
sale of chicken and a few other products, these transactions are far from
being considered as normal trade. Due to agricultural subsidies in the US,
the prices of these products are lower as compared to prices in other
markets, which leads Cuba to choose to purchase certain foodstuffs there.
However, these purchases are made under strict conditions: they require
specific licenses from the Department of Commerce; they must be paid for
in cash and in advance, without any possibility to receive financing or
credits, as opposite to modern commercial practices. Besides, goods must
be transported only by US vessels that are only allowed to make one-way
trips, which considerably increase freight costs.
19
These restrictions hinder the supposed trade between the US and Cuba
and evidence that the blockade truly exists. The sole purpose of these
measures is to deter and discourage any type of business with Cuba, thus
limiting its ability to trade freely, which negatively affects its economy.
Overall, during this period, damages and losses in the agricultural
sector amounted to USD 932,316,224.
The blockade imposed by the US government has a profound and
multifaceted impact on the production of teaching aids in Cuba, which
seriously affects the quality and development of the education system at
all levels. During this period, commercial operations were restricted and
access to international credit for the acquisition of raw materials and other
resources used in the production of teaching aids was limited. In this
sector, the effects of the blockade during the period under review has been
estimated at USD 89,771,200.
MSc. Lisandra Guerra Sosa, who works at the Workers and Peasants
Night College ‘Treinta Aniversario de la Batalla de Guisa’ (Thirtieth
Anniversary of the Battle of Guisa) in the municipality of Bayamo, in the
Granma province, states that as a result of the blockade policy, they are
faced with “limitations in the availability of instructional materials such as
textbooks, workbooks, specialized dictionaries, maps, laboratories, among
others, for the teaching of language classes. There is also insufficient
availability of computers, TV sets and spare parts to guarantee quality
education. Sometimes the communication platform of the sector's website
is blocked, and we cannot publicize the achievements that are made."
Impacts such as this are being felt throughout the entire country, which
also affect the acquisition of materials, spare parts and accessories
necessary for the manufacturing of pencils, paper, notebooks, drawing
instruments, tempera paints, visual arts teaching modules, paper, toilet
bowls, ballpoint pens and other educational materials in Cuba. The Total
impact has been estimated at CUP 33,932,004. As a result of this, a total
of 2,147,300 textbooks could not be printed for the academic year 2024.
Yoelandi Argote Rodríguez is a 15-year-old Cuban teenager who uses a
cochlear implant. The restrictions imposed by the blockade prevent him
from receiving accessories for his medical devices, forcing him to resort to
lip reading as an alternative in the communication and teaching-learning
process.
Besides, 940 students with deafness or hearing loss have not been able
to receive adequate care due to the impossibility of purchasing from the
US market computers for correction and compensation of specialized
20
treatments; cochlear implant procedures; equipment and air conditioning
for the auditory stimulation room and hearing aids. Purchasing them from
a more distant market involves higher costs, which means that less
equipment can be imported and, consequently, there is a lower number of
students receiving this service.
In addition to these restrictions, there are other issues affecting this sector:
Of a total of 1,093 childcare facilities, 35 have been shut down due
to structural problems. The lack of funding resulting from the
negative impact of the blockade on the country's sources of income
has prevented a prompt solution to this problem.
In early childhood education, there is a continued shortage of toys
and teaching aids, which affects the implementation of educational
activities that encourage the learning of skills. If the blockade did not
exist, 67,035 children of different ages could benefit from these
means.
For the education of children and teenagers suffering from visual
impairments, 63 Braille machines and 20 Braille printers are
required. Only three of the latter are currently available. Difficulties
in accessing financing prevented the acquisition of these essential
means for the education of these students during 2024.
To meet the needs of children with motor and hearing disabilities,
538 electric and conventional wheelchairs and 1,107 hearing aids
must be purchased. At the same time, the 16 existing audiometers
in the provinces are in poor condition, which affects the auditory
stimulation of more than 300 students attending special schools and
800 attending regular schools. The impact amounts to USD
295,548.35.
Academic exchange is being limited and Cuban teachers,
specialists, and students are unable to attend in-person and virtual
events. The impossibility to conduct transactions in US dollars; the
denial of visas to attend events and the banned access to virtual
platforms such as Zoom, Cisco Webex and Interprefy hinder the
preparation and training of teaching staff and students.
At the Central University ‘Marta Abreu’ of Las Villas (UCLV), there
are at least three virtual events every week in which it is impossible
21
to participate due to banned access to web platforms. In January,
2025, this university welcomed a delegation of professors from
Carthage College from the US, with the aim of establishing some
cooperation.
However,
the
proposed
Memorandum
of
Understanding will not be signed until the US counterpart makes an
assessment of the possible punitive measures and actions that this
cooperation could entail. This is a clear example of the deterrent
effect of the blockade.
In the field of sports, the impact during the period under review amounts
to USD 4,114,091. There has been an increase in the restrictions imposed
and the costs of sport equipment, fabrics, footwear, technical and
pedagogical resources, technological support, among others, which are
mainly produced in the US. The purchase of these products in third
countries increases expenses by more than 50 per cent.
The main impacts reported in this area relate to obstacles to receive
payments for professional services provided abroad and in Cuba. This has
been clearly evidenced by the prohibition of payments to Cuba and the
financial persecution of incomes obtained from Cuba’s participation in
sport events, arbitration, ticket refunds, and prizes won by Cuban athletes,
as well as the export of sports services.
New methods have been introduced to hinder banking operations, such as
the request for additional documents to process such transactions, which
causes delays and makes it difficult to make payments and charge for
services rendered.
In this regard, funds transfers to Cuban sports federations resulting from
the hiring of Cuban athletes abroad have been increasingly hindered. For
example, it was not possible to transfer to Cuba funds from the NipponHam Baseball Club in Japan. This forced the country to spend these funds
in Japan, which were used to purchase balls for children, with the
consequent increase in transportation costs. Had this funding been
available in Cuba, this purchase could have been made in Panama with
50 per cent savings in costs. With the funds used to cover freight costs,
948 more balls could have been purchased.
Cuba is a member of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and, as such,
is required to pay its annual dues. Last year, the country made payments
in February, but in November, Banco Central de Cuba reported that the
transaction was reversed due to internal policies of the beneficiary’s bank.
To date, it has not been possible to pay the fees for the years 2024 and
2025, which could prevent Cuba from participating in international events
or hosting events in the country if this situation persists.
22
As in previous years, this period was also characterized by the nonpayment of Cuban athletes' contracts with different clubs, due to the
refusal by foreign banking and financial institutions to process transactions
with Cuba’s Banco Financiero Internacional (BFI).
In early 2025, the current US administration denied visas to the basketball
team that was to participate in a qualifying tournament in Puerto Rico.
Actions such as this, coupled with excessive controls on our delegations
at US Immigration and Customs, as well as smear campaigns on social
media aimed at preventing Cuba from hosting events have persisted and
generated substantial losses.
In June, 2025, the US government denied visas to members of the
delegation that would represent Cuba in the Norceca Final Four women's
volleyball tournament, to be held in Puerto Rico. This action, contrary to
the commitments inherent in the responsibility taken up by countries
hosting international sporting events, hinders Cuba's participation in a
competition that is part of the qualifying route for the 2026 Central
American and Caribbean Games scheduled to be held in Santo Domingo
and counts towards NORCECA and world rankings.
This is an unfair and discriminatory position, contrary to the principles of
sport and “fair play”, which adds to what has happened so far this year
against delegations from other disciplines.
The denial of visas to the Cuban girls' softball technical team in July 2025,
without any valid justification, is another example of the current US
government's attack on Cuba. This decision prevents the Cuban team
from participating in the Little League World Series. Contrary to the spirit
of international sportsmanship, this decision makes the dreams of these
girls yet another victim of the blockade and hatred of the US government.
In the sphere of culture, the blockade significantly restricts the possibility
to promote, publicize and market Cuban talents, further hindering the
search for market niches and business opportunities. Consequently, sales
prices are depressed and access to and enjoyment of our art by audiences
from all continents is hampered. During this period, the quantified impact
on this sector amounts to USD 195,095,600.
The blockade hinders access to technologies for the production of digital
books, hampering their promotion and sale, since many digital platforms
cannot be used from within the country, and online stores that establish
contractual relationships directly with a Cuban company are exposed to
sanctions.
23
Cuban orchestras and musicians are directly affected by the blockade,
which prevents them from accessing the US market. If the blockade did
not exist, at least ten Cuban orchestras could tour the US annually,
generating approximately USD 3,000,000 in revenues.
The extraterritorial implementation of the blockade has made it difficult to
exchange royalty payments between the Cuban Music Copyright Agency
(ACDAM) and foreign societies, as banking institutions in several countries
have refused to process financial transactions with the Cuban entity Banco
Financiero Internacional (BFI).
Cuba’s Recording and Music Publishing Company (EGREM) cannot sell
its productions directly on the US market. It depends on intermediaries
located in the US or in third countries. In addition to that, the bank accounts
of EGREM and its potential partners in that country are subject to
continued persecution, forcing the company to resort to intermediaries in
third countries. This leads to increased costs and delays in negotiation
processes.
Cuban artists find it difficult to obtain visas and participate in international
events, such as the Latin Grammys and other music festivals in the US. In
2024, they were unable to participate in major competitions, affecting their
careers and the publicizing of their talent.
Due to the shortage of raw materials, a large number of titles -as many as
950- have accumulated and are yet to be published. This has had an
incalculable cost in cultural and scientific terms, since the publishing plans
for the period from 2020 to 2024 have not been met. Besides, the average
amount of sales that failed to be accomplished due to this situation
amounts to approximately USD 3,770,833.
Traditional suppliers in the portfolio of the Instituto Cubano del Arte e
Industria Cinematográficos (Cuban Institute of Cinematographic Art and
Industry) now require only letters of credit confirmed by foreign banks as
a method of payment. The cost they take up in terms of the country risk
entails an additional increase of up to 50 per cent in import prices, only for
carrying out commercial transactions with Cuba.
Since 2023, the Latin American Literary Agency, which is part of the Cuban
Book Institute, had signed a contract with the Mexican television network
Televisa for the renewal of the film adaptation of Félix B. Caignet's work
entitled ‘Morir por Vivir’ (To Die for Living). However, Televisa
subsequently joined forces with the US television network Univision, which
24
is not allowed to make payments to the Cuban agency. For this reason,
payment remains outstanding.
The Japanese agency UniJapan has signed a contract for the publication
of “Cuentos Completos” (Complete Short Stories) by the famous Cuban
author Virgilio Piñera. In February of this year, the agency reported that it
had not been possible to make the payment due to financial restrictions
imposed on Cuba. The contract was signed for an amount of 2 thousand
916 dollars, which is still pending collection.
The website Spotify, which accounts for 80 per cent of the streamings
generated by Cuban catalogs and is the main platform for music
consumption, is a store that we cannot access for the purpose of
monitoring its operation and creating profiles of our artists, which impacts
on the promotion of Cuban culture internationally.
Impacts on economic development, trade, and finance
The economic development context in Cuba in 2024 became more
complex as a result of the impact of the strengthened measures that make
up the US blockade. The country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
contracted by 1.1 per cent in 2024.
Should this genocidal policy not exist, the GDP growth during that year at
current prices would have been 9.2 percentage points higher than
recorded. The economy declined in 2024 and has recorded an 11 per cent
downfall since 2018.
At the end of 2024, exports reached the figure of USD 9,639,000,000.
Goods export plan was met by 92.5 per cent and the services export plan
was met by 101.6 per cent. However, total exports accounted for USD
770,000,000 less than planned. This, combined with the fact that the
economy's revenues were USD 900,000,000 less than expected, has
forced the Cuban economy to work under even greater strain than in
previous years.
Planned imports reached only 82.4 per cent of the 2024 target, and they
focused on fuels, foodstuffs, medicines and medical supplies. Continued
declines were reported in key sectors such as food production, where the
rationed family basket is currently 100 per cent covered with imported
products.
25
A critical situation has been faced since the end of 2023, when the stable
supply of different types of fuel was lost. In 2024, particularly during the
second semester of that year, power generation faced an acute crisis due
to equipment failures, the impact of two hurricanes and lack of fuel,
especially diesel, with deficits ranging from 1,400 to 1,500 megawatts per
day, including three disconnections of the National Electric Power Grid
between October and December of 2024. This situation had a strong
impact on the Cuban economy and the population.
Transforming the cost of the blockade into the country's payment capacity
would provide an additional, substantial and sustained source of financing
that would give greater momentum to investment programs linked to the
strategic sectors identified by the National Economic and Social
Development Plan until 2030. This would create the necessary conditions
to gradually achieve sustained growth rates. The blockade policy is the
biggest obstacle to the development of the Cuban economy.
Due to Cuba's inclusion in the unilateral list of States allegedly sponsors
of terrorism, the costs of businesses involving foreign investments has
increased and commercial operations, cooperative actions and investment
projects that were at different stages of implementation have been
cancelled.
The critical restrictions imposed on Cuba’s socio-economic context had
adverse impacts, even on United Nations programs in Cuba, particularly
in terms of access to funding, including development financing; increased
operating costs; limited access to goods, services, IT platforms and
technologies patented in the US and to financial services from US banks.
Besides, the blockade prohibits shipping companies from other countries
from calling at US ports for six months if they have previously touched a
Cuban port. This measure entails a significant additional cost to our
country's maritime transport and foreign trade and it represents an
aggressive provision against third parties.
In the period from March 2024 to February 2025, losses due to the
geographical relocation of trade, given the need to resort to more distant
markets, were estimated at around USD 1,212,700,000.
Likewise, the costs of freight, insurance, and the use of commercial
intermediaries, with the consequent increase in the price of goods,
amounted to USD 1,127,100,000.
The impact of the blockade on production and services, due to the
impossibility of acquiring spare parts, raw materials and products in the
26
US market, whose specifications cannot be replaced by other suppliers,
has caused damages amounting to USD 880,800,000, a figure that is 80
per cent higher than that reported in the previous period.
There is also a system of draconian fines to prosecute transactions with
Cuba from third countries, which further increases the cost of our foreign
trade. Between March 2024 and February 2025, 40 foreign banks, for
various reasons, refused to carry out transactions with Cuban banking
entities (27 from Europe, 6 from America, and 7 from the rest of the world)
which involved 140 transactions.
During the period under review, the US government's relentless
persecution of financial transactions involving Cuba has affected virtually
all sectors of the economy. This siege has led to the termination and/or
breaches of contracts, loss of relationships with financial institutions that
regularly worked with Cuban entities, indebtedness and delays in the
sending and reception of funds and goods, among other difficulties.
Numerous companies from third countries that are traditional exporters of
products and materials that are essential to the Cuban economy are
refusing to act as suppliers or are finding additional difficulties to secure
financing to support exports to Cuba. The cost of this extraterritorial effect
is tens of millions of dollars worth and causes delays in supplies, shortages
of raw materials, and severe damage to the country's manufacturing
production.
This has had an extremely harsh impact on the Cuban economy,
particularly on the commercial activities of companies and the links
between Cuban and international banks.
One of the main impacts of this intimidating effect is the prohibition of
transfers of funds in US dollars or other hard currencies; the cancellation
of accounts of embassies and companies with Cuban interests abroad and
financial services for businesses related to Cuba; and the denial of credit
facilities or the processing of letters of credit.
This is the result of the surveillance and control mechanisms imposed by
the US on international banking and a direct consequence of the fines
worth millions of dollars that have been imposed on foreign banks in recent
years.
At the same time, the persecution of the country’s sources of hard currency
incomes has deprived us of financial resources that are essential for
acquiring vital supplies for the Cuban population.
27
During this period, Cuban banks suffered losses amounting to USD
169,500,000 due to sharp exchange rate fluctuations resulting from the
use of currencies from third countries, the ban on the use of the US dollar
and the need to find alternatives so that financial flows can reach the
country and other destinations.
This is an evidence of the exacerbated crisis that the country continues to
face, in a very complex scenario characterized by the continued decline in
foreign trade, with an incalculable impact on the socio-economic situation.
Currently, there are virtually no open accounts left in US dollars in foreign
banks owned by Cuba’s commercial bank.
During this period, Cuba was only able to access very limited external
financing and under extremely onerous conditions. Cuban banking and
business entities continue to pay high interest rates above market rates
due to the country risk rating applied to them. This exacerbates
macroeconomic imbalances, reflected in an annual inflation rate of 24.88
per cent in 2024, with values that may differ depending on the type of
market (13.97 per cent in the state segment, 82 per cent in the non-state
segment and 4.03 per cent in the agricultural market segment).
These high levels of inflation are influenced by the issuance of money by
the State to finance the budget deficit; the contraction of supplies, mainly
in the state sector; the imported inflation due to high prices on the world
market and, above all, the limited inflow of hard currency into the country
as a result of the strengthening of the blockade.
Disinformation campaigns and financial manipulation through virtual tools,
such as “El Toque,” which is financially backed by the National Endowment
for Democracy (NED) and the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM),
have also played a role. The aim is to distort exchange rates in the country,
thus inciting the devaluation of the Cuban peso against the US dollar in
order to generate price instability, a decline in the population's purchasing
power, and the consequent social discontent.
The shortage of goods and services in formal markets, the proliferation of
the informal market and the increase in prices have eroded the purchasing
power of wages and pensions.
Despite the State's strong commitment to finding ways to mitigate the
effects of the blockade, the economic situation remains adverse. The
economy has been unable to advance more quickly and dynamically due
to the impossibility of achieving the expected export revenues. In this
regard alone, during the period under review, the blockade has caused
damages amounting to USD 2,608,000,000.
28
Damaging the tourism sector has remained a priority of the blockade
policy. Damages caused to this sector, particularly in the areas related to
services, operations and logistical support, amounted to USD
2,528,791,469 during the period from March, 2024 to February, 2025.
The arrival of visitors to Cuba decreased by 9.6 per cent as compared to
2023. With 2,203,117 international visitors, the planned target was met by
71.07 per cent. This situation was influenced by the cumulative effect of
the blockade; Cuba's continued inclusion in the list of State sponsors of
terrorism and the US government's continued enforcement of a list of
restricted Cuban entities, which has included almost all of the country's
hotel facilities. In terms of exports, losses in this sector during the period
under review amounted to USD 1,114,600,000.
With regard to 2023, the arrival of US visitors decreased by 11 per cent.
The ban on accommodation in most of the hotels included in the OFAC's
list of restricted entities, as well as the conditions imposed by the US
government on the use of private sector lenders under the ‘travel category’
have contributed to create this situation.
The measure adopted by the US government to eliminate general licenses
for “people-to-people” educational group travel exacerbates the negative
impact on the arrival of US visitors in the country. Although travelers from
the US were already required to travel under the sponsorship of a US
organization, which discouraged the arrival of visitors from that country,
the new measure completely eliminates the possibility of traveling under
this category.
Should the blockade and the ban on US nationals travels to Cuba as
tourists not exist, our country would receive between 1,000,000 and
2,000,000 US visitors every year, which will represent USD 2,410,826,390
dollars in revenues for the Cuban economy.
The implementation of the Helms-Burton Act has had a direct impact on
the termination of business deals and contracts with foreign hotel
operators and has influenced managers from third countries, who have
declined their interest in exploring business opportunities with Cuba. Fortyone international operators have found themselves in this situation.
Restricted access to Cuban ports by US cruise lines, further strengthened
by sanctions and legal proceedings against those that have operated with
Cuba, has hampered progress in this sector. As a result of that, some
800,000 visitors from the US have stopped traveling to Cuba.
29
The US government's decision to require an entry visa for anyone who has
traveled to Cuba or wishes to travel from our country, including those
benefiting from the ESTA system, has had an adverse effect on the arrival
in the country of Cubans residing abroad and visitors from the 42 countries
that are benefitted from the program. It has also discouraged travel by US
citizens to Cuba.
As a consequence of the US government's financial persecution, a
growing number of foreign banks have refused to work with Cuba, which
has led to a drastic reduction in commercial operations, with the
consequent impact on the sale of tourist packages. Havanatur, a leader in
the promotion and marketing of Cuban tourism products, has faced the
closure of its accounts abroad, which has resulted in a loss of USD
2,180,900.
The slowness of the payment processes currently used by banks has
caused serious harm. The inability to use the US dollar has led travel
agencies to resort to highly risky and costly transfer methods, often
involving more than three currency exchanges, which causes significant
losses.
The obstacles imposed on commercial transactions with Cuba have led to
a decline in potential investors in the tourism sector, thus affecting the
development of the business lines of the extra-hotel services company
Palmares S.A. and the four projects contained in the Foreign Investments
Opportunity Portfolio. In the case of the Varadero Water Park project,
around 30 companies have been invited to participate, but they have either
declined or lost interest.
Added to this are the aggressive political and media campaigns to discredit
the quality of tourism services and Cuba as a safe destination.
The biotechnology sector is also impacted by the blockade. The “Cuban
Democracy Act” (Torricelli Act) explicitly prohibits the sale of inputs and
raw materials for the biotechnology industry in Cuba. During this period,
damages in this area amount to approximately USD 129,270,055,
resulting from lost export revenues, losses due to geographical relocation
of trade and monetary impacts.
The blockade caused difficulties in 14 operations of the Finlay Vaccine
Institute (IFV), for reasons of reagents, raw materials and supplies. Most
of these materials had to be purchased through third parties, which led to
significant increases in prices per unit and freight costs.
30
Medsol Laboratories was unable to produce Omeprazole, Fluconazole
and Oseltamivir capsules due to a breakdown in its German-made
equipment, the Harro Höfliger capsule filler. Although the importation of
spare parts and technical assistance was arranged through
FARMACUBA, in December, 2024, the manufacturer decided to end
negotiations with Cuba because of the blockade. This resulted in a loss of
USD 1,020,272. 99 and reduced the availability of these medicines for the
Cuban population.
The commercial transaction for the purchase of hemodialysis bags from
the then KAM Bag in Box Latam Company in Argentina could not be
carried out because, as a result of its merger with a US entity, it is not
allowed to establish commercial relations with Cuban institutions.
The tightening of the blockade has maintained a high perception of risk
among US companies for the negotiation and future marketing of the
Cuban product Heberprot-P, the only one of its kind in the world for the
treatment of diabetic foot ulcers, which reduces amputations due to this
disease. If this product could be exported to the US, patients from that
country would have access to this innovative treatment, and revenues from
this source would have amounted to some USD 90,000,000 during the
period covered by this report.
In the case of the energy and mining sector, damages during the period
under review have been estimated at USD 496,075,620. The National
Electric Union reports the largest amount of damages, which amount to
USD 279,345,500.
The economic blockade has exacerbated financial constraints and access
to credit to repair the country's thermo power plants; acquire the necessary
technologies and fuel to ensure a stable power supply to the population
and strategic sectors of the national economy and create new power
generation capacities from renewable energy sources that allow for
greater energy independence in the Island.
The blockade has affected imports for the Cuban oil industry. The average
cost of a 20-foot container from China in 2024 was USD 5,980; from
Europe USD 2,590 and from Canada USD 3,925. From Houston to Mariel,
under normal conditions, the cost would not exceed the range from USD
800 to USD 1,000, depending on the time of year. Therefore, in 2024,
Cuba would have saved USD 1,014,298 dollars by replacing freight costs
if it had been able to access that product in the US.
The persecution of fuel transfer operations to Cuba, including shipping
companies, insurers, reinsurers, banks, individual persons and
31
governments, has reduced the portfolio of foreign suppliers; and those that
are still part of said portfolio have increased their prices considerably,
based on the Country Risk.
As a result of that persecution, fuel imports are paid for through irrevocable
and confirmed letters of credit (payable at sight) with a single bank, whose
confirmation capacity is limited and often does not cover the value of the
shipments to be imported during one month.
Obstacles to the importation of fuel, spare parts, and machinery, including
suppliers' fears of US sanctions, have severely affected the prolonged
instability of the National Power System (SEN) and the constant
breakdowns in the thermal power generation mechanisms, which have
limited the operation of distributed generation in the country.
Power generation absorbs most of the fuel imported to sustain the Cuban
economy: more than half of all the fuel used by the country is allocated to
power generation. The country needs to spend between USD 250,000,000
and USD 350,000,000 each year just to maintain power generation under
normal operating conditions. The attack on the country's sources of hard
currency has prevented it from having the financial resources necessary
to keep the National Power System operational.
At the end of 2024, the lack of material resources and financing resulting
from the impact of the blockade caused national crude oil production to
decline by some 138,028 tons. In this complex situation, the country
manages to produce approximately 40,000 barrels per day, which can only
cover one-third of national consumption.
The total generation capacity of the Cuban Electric Union is 5,646
megawatts. However, only 2,122 megawatts, or 38 per cent, are available
daily. Between 4,800,000 and 5,000,000 tons of fuel are required to meet
the country's normal electricity demand, at a cost raging between USD
1,600,000,000 and USD 1,800,000,000 per year, depending on fuel price
variability in the market. As a result of that, there have been continued
power outages that affect the population and have a cross-cutting impact
on all sectors of the economy.
Since January 10, 2024, the ‘Ernesto Che Guevara’ thermoelectric power
plant has been unable to receive spare parts for its pumps after the Italian
supplier C.R. Technology Systems was acquired by Trillium Flow
Technologies, which manages purchases from the US. The lack of OFAC
authorization for legal permits prevented the contract from being
completed. This has led to limitations that have extended into the current
period under review, causing limitations in generation units, increased
32
energy costs and blackouts that have affected the country's electricity
service.
The power plants ‘Ernesto Guevara de la Serna’, ‘Diez de Octubre’ and
‘Máximo Gómez’ use VOITH electro-hydraulic actuators in their
modernized turbines. Over time, this equipment wears out. Regular
suppliers, such as Real Control and Energo-Control have reported that,
due to the Helms-Burton Act, they cannot sell this equipment to Cuba.
Consequently, Block number 2 of the ‘Ernesto Guevara’ thermoelectric
power plant cannot currently be started up.
The company Taichi HD Cuba, which was asked to supply a new VCS6000 AVR excitation system for the ‘Carlos Manuel de Céspedes’
thermoelectric power plant, responded that Mitsubishi Generator Corp is
the appropriate company to handle this matter. However, it said it cannot
submit a quote for the new system due to strict US government sanctions,
and that this decision would not be changed.
During the period under review, the economic damages caused by the
blockade to the information and communications technology sector,
including telecommunications, have been estimated at USD 78,064,500.
ETECSA continued to be the most affected company, recording losses
amounting to USD 73,675,900, which accounts for 94.3 per cent of the
total damages caused in the sector.
Financial difficulties resulting mainly from the impact of the blockade have
affected ETECSA's infrastructure and service quality, with the company
reporting losses of more than USD 500,000,000 annually over the past
three years. The accumulation of debts and frauds promoted by illegal
operators abroad meant that, of every 20 dollars in international recharge
sales, 18 dollars were obtained by illegal operators and therefore were not
deposited in ETECSA's accounts.
Continued harassment and pressures on entities with commercial
relations with Cuba and others interested in negotiating with Cuban
communications companies have had a negative impact on the possibility
of having adequate infrastructure, greater access to the Internet and ICTs
introduction to further develop the process of technological modernization
in the country.
The main telecommunications technology suppliers (Ericsson, Alcatel, and
Huawei) require an End User Declaration, which delays the process of
contracting and delivering equipment and affects the sovereignty of third
countries in their relations with Cuba in the field of communications and
information technology.
33
The blockade makes it impossible to access high-performance brands and
equipment distributed by leading US companies in the sector, such as Dell,
Cisco, HP, Netgear, Grandstream-Networks, APC, among others.
Restrictions on the supply of technologies and equipment produced under
license or with US components have forced the country to resort to more
distant markets, with the consequent increase in freight, repair and
maintenance costs.
Cuba's continued presence in the list of countries allegedly sponsoring
terrorism hinders the reception of private express parcels from the US. In
the absence of a money order agreement between the US and Cuba,
citizens of both countries continue to use riskier alternatives. The
suspension of Western Union services due to punitive measures by the
US government has exacerbated the situation. For this reason, more than
USD 837,200,000 have failed to enter the country, with the foreseeable
impact this would have on innumerable Cuban families.
Postal administrations of several countries from all continents, which
previously used to pay Cuban banks directly, were unable to do so due to
the financial blockade.
Payments for the broadcast of the 2024 Paris Olympic Games on Cuban
television increased by USD 114,807.21, which exceeded the cost of the
service, due to the ban on commercial transactions involving US
companies or others associated companies that depend on US banks for
their transactions. It was necessary to resort to intermediaries, with the
consequent increase in costs.
Restrictions on the access to broadband Internet links remain in place,
which affects the download speed of software, music, radio and television
programs that are broadcast in real time, as well as access to sites offering
updates to programs used by millions of users worldwide. The Adobe site
continues to be blocked for Cuba, thus making it impossible to access help
for certain programs that are only available online, such as the latest
versions of the Audition CS6 multi-track editor. Other sites of interest, such
as Source Forge, WeTransfer, DELL and INTEL have been placed under
these restrictions.
These obstacles restrict the flow of information and widespread access to
the Internet in Cuba; they make connectivity difficult and expensive and
limit Cuban users' access to various virtual platforms.
Cuban representatives have faced numerous difficulties to participate in
virtual meetings and events, since Cuba has restricted access to several
34
digital platforms, such as Zoom. In other cases, sites appear to be
restricted to Cuban IP addresses in accordance with measures imposed
by OFAC, which is discriminatory and illegal.
The global market for radio and television supplies is dominated by large
international corporations such as Sony Group Corporation, Panasonic
Corporation, and JVC Kenwood Holdings Inc., which distribute their
products by specific geographic regions. For Cuba's Institute of
Information and Social Communication (ICS), this means that it must
purchase resources through authorized distributors for Latin America,
many of which are located in Miami. Due to the blockade, Cuban requests
are often ignored, thus forcing the country to resort to intermediaries in
Europe, placing it at a significant disadvantage in terms of technological
modernization.
During the period under review, it has been estimated that the damage
caused by the blockade to the Cuban industry amounts to USD
51,069,079.54, which results from the loss of goods and services export
incomes, the geographical relocation of trade, the exchange rate
fluctuations, the impact of the technological blockade and the shortages of
fuel. Below there is a description of some of the most significant impacts
on this sector:
The company ACINOX Comercial cannot purchase the raw
materials, spare parts and metals necessary for metallurgical
production in the US market; therefore, these products must be
purchased in more distant markets.
As a result of the implementation of the Torricelli Act, the shipping
companies Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A., A.P. MøllerMærsk, COSCO SHIPPING Lines Co, Evergreen Marine
Corporation and Zim Integrated Shipping Service have stopped
trading with Cuba. There are only three shipping companies that
maintain commercial ties with the country.
The telecommunications company COPEXTEL S.A. was only able
to import from 57 suppliers out of a portfolio of 628, accounting for
9.08 per cent. Of those 57 suppliers, 91.2 per cent are
intermediaries, while 8.8 per cent are manufacturers, which had an
impact on the increased costs of the products and services
purchased.
The closure of banking operations between international and Cuban
banks was confirmed, as in the case of the National Bank of Canada,
35
which rejected the letter of credit for operations with Cuba’s
Chemical Industry Business Group.
Steel mills were expected to produce 87,015 tons of exportable steel
this year, which would generate export revenues amounting to USD
894,780.42. However, this was not possible due to the energy
shortages and fuel deficits caused by the impact of the blockade.
There have been shortages in the supply of toothpaste, chlorine
bleach and floor cloths, due to the shortage of raw materials in the
industry and the instability in supplies.
The store chain Caribe reported losses estimated at USD
50,180,000, a 319 per cent increase as compared to 2023.
Furthermore, a large amount of equipment was written off in 2024
due to the lack of spare parts for repair.
Purchases of refrigerated products such as chicken, turkey and beef,
which are mainly produced in North America, must be made in other
countries, which lead to increased freight costs, higher commodities
costs, longer shipping times, and the need to store these products in
warehouses to keep the necessary reserves and ensure restocking
of commercial units.
The Cuban entity Fincimex is prevented from operating the main
remittance market to Cuba, since it has been included in the US
State Department's list of restricted entities. Without the blockade,
USD 900,000 would have been received as family aid for Cuban
citizens in 2024.
The construction sector continues to face serious difficulties to access
more efficient and lighter construction technologies consuming less basic
materials and energy components. Between March, 2024 and February,
2025, losses in this sector were reported to be worth USD 161,862,700.
The housing construction program was one of the hardest-hit, with
damages amounting to USD 34,324,900. Supply plans for this program
were met by only 28 per cent.
The main damages resulted from difficulties in accessing essential goods
and technologies for the materials manufacturing industry, including
cement, aggregates, steel, paints, water tanks, lightweight roofing, blocks,
36
fiber-cement tiles, asphalt blankets and carpentry. Added to this are the
termination of contracts with foreign suppliers and the difficulties in
transportation due to fuel shortages.
The greatest damage caused by insufficient fuel supplies and the shortage
of material resources were evidenced in construction projects at airports,
the National Highway, the Central Highway, the northern cays, the Central
Water Transfer Canal and the Eastern Water Transfer Canal.
The damage caused by the blockade to the transport sector - maritime,
automotive, railway and air transportation- reached the figure of USD
353,034,200 between March, 2024 and February, 2025.
In recent years, there has been a progressive deterioration in the
passengers’ transportation capacity and infrastructure, given the low
technical availability of vehicles, the impossibility of accessing spare parts,
both due to lack of liquidity and the refusal of suppliers, as well as the
measures adopted since 2019 by the US government to prevent fuel
supplies. This has led to a lower service offer to the population.
For example, at least 1,200 operational vehicles are required to guarantee
passengers’ transportation in the capital. Currently, there are only 566, of
which between 120 and 170 operate daily. A total of 48,000 tons of diesel
is needed to meet transportation demands in Havana, which is not
possible due to the shortage of financing and the increased cost of
operations as a result of the siege imposed against Cuba.
Still in place are the restrictions imposed on international ship- owners,
whose vessels are crewed by Cubans; and the obstacles to access US
ports, by virtue of the Torricelli Act. When the corresponding authorities
learn that any given vessel is crewed by Cuban staff, in addition to holding
said vessel outside the port for several hours, they establish a guard on
the ship, the cost of which is to be borne by the shipping company or shipowner, at a rate of USD 1,500 per every day of stay in said port, and in
addition to that our sailors are not allowed to go ashore.
In the case of air transportation, the US government continues to withhold
licenses to lease aircraft, which means that the company Cubana de
Aviación cannot bid for international flights. Nor can aircraft having more
than 10 percent US-made components be purchased, which also affects
domestic air transportation.
Interline agreements for cargo transportation remain canceled, thus
preventing its commercialization with Cubana de Aviación airway bills and
the increase in multi-destination sales in commercial alliances with
37
Avianca, DHL, Air France, LATAM, and Lot Polish. The cancellation of
these agreements affects the service that could be offered to the exports
and imports of business and non-state sectors, since they are forced to
use alternative routes at higher costs.
Impacts on the emerging sectors of the Cuban economy
Until April, 2025, there were 11,233 private micro, small and medium-sized
enterprises (MSMEs) registered in Cuba. The blockade also affects the
activity of these private entrepreneurs, business owners and Cuban
cooperatives. In 2024, 608 MSMEs -6 per cent of the total- reported
losses.
The US administration has repeatedly claimed that the blockade is only
intended to punish the Cuban government and not the people or the
private sector. The measures announced in May 2024, supposedly to
benefit this sector in terms of access to digital and financial services, never
materialized. The structural barriers of the blockade and its legal
framework remain the main obstacle to any economic activity in Cuba.
US technology companies intended to unlock tools face the challenge of
discriminating between state and private actors.
Cuba's inclusion in the list of alleged States sponsors of terrorism deters
international transactions for fear of fines. Added to this is the rejection of
foreign shipping companies and banks, which avoid doing business with
Cuba due to secondary sanctions and regulatory volatility, which also
harms the activity of the non-state sector.
Travel alerts and restrictions on the trips to Cuba have affected incomes
from tourism and accommodation, a service provided by a majority
segment of the Cuban private sector. The List of Prohibited
Accommodations, Cuba's inclusion in the List of States Sponsors of
Terrorism and the ban on individual people-to-people travel exchanges,
among other measures already outlined, have affected this sector and
significantly reduced bookings in private rental homes. The main
restriction imposed on these actors is the lack of access to the US tourist
market, which places them at a competitive disadvantage as compared to
other destinations in the region.
Cuba has a capacity of more than 20,000 rooms in private rental homes.
Between March, 2024 and February, 2025, of the 139,358 US citizens who
visited the country, only 9.6 per cent stayed at these accommodations,
which represented a sharp reduction of 82.2 per cent as compared to the
previous period as a result of the policies implemented. If the current
38
restrictions and prohibitions did not exist and the flow of US visitors
increased, the Cuban private sector could have earned additional incomes
amounting to approximately USD 14,400,000.
In Old Havana, when cruise ship operations from the US began in 2016,
private businesses catering to these tourists proliferated. New restaurants,
Cuban handicrafts shops, kiosks selling Cuban literature and cars and
taxis for hire, among other services, opened up. With the ban on cruise
ships visits to Cuba, all these businesses were affected, and even many
of them in several provinces of the country closed.
The impossibility to process non-immigrant visas in Havana has limited the
ability of Cuban entrepreneurs to travel to the US, the closest natural
market for acquiring the supplies necessary for their activity.
Coercive measures by the US government against financial institutions
have led several payment and e-commerce platforms, such as PayPal, to
refuse to provide services to these individuals simply because they are
Cuban, regardless of the type of business they run. They are equally
unable to access Visa or Mastercard cards to acquire supplies for their
businesses, since these are banned for Cubans anywhere in the world.
Therefore, they do not have a secure online payment method, not even
through a third country. Consequently, bank branches do not complete
their transactions and many customers decide not to continue their
relationships with private Cuban entities.
Limitations on the access to the US market make imports and exports
more expensive and often difficult for these actors. The “Nuevo Golfito”
Local Development project, based in the Alamar neighborhood of Havana,
is a community resort designed for the enjoyment of local residents,
particularly children, with a traditional mini golf course and other
recreational options. Faced with power outages resulting from the
limitations imposed by the blockade on the proper functioning of the
National Power System, Roger Núñez Hernández, the founder and
manager of “Nuevo Golfito,” is working to acquire solar panels that will
allow his project to operate optimally. Núñez Hernández stated: “We have
tried to find options to import them from the US and other closer markets,
but the blockade regulations limit our access. That is why we are exploring
more distant markets, but the cost of freight makes this alternative too
expensive.”
Similarly, PDL Remolques-YGC-Cuba has faced obstacles in
manufacturing its product: trailers for cars, motorcycles, and bicycles. Its
founder, Yosvany García Cruz, explained that "although our trailers are
39
made from recycled materials and are very popular among users, there
are certain parts and supplies that, if purchased in the US or other nearby
markets, would facilitate and speed up the production and delivery
process. Unfortunately, this option is not viable due to the obstacles
imposed by the blockade."
The blockade is a violation of International Law. Extraterritorial
implementation of the blockade
The blockade violates international law. It is contrary to the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It constitutes a violation of
the right to peace, development, self-determination and sovereignty of the
Cuban people and State.
Given its essence and objectives, it is an act of unilateral aggression and
a permanent threat to the stability of the country. It violates the principles
of non-interference in the internal affairs of States, sovereign equality, the
promotion of friendly relations among countries and freedom of trade.
The blockade not only damages economic, commercial, and financial ties
between Cuba and the US. It aims to, and succeeds in, damaging Cuba's
economic and commercial relations with any country in the world, with
disregard for its sovereign prerogatives and the rights of its citizens. It is a
malicious purpose that takes legal form in the Helms-Burton Act.
In its attempt to prevent foreign investment in the country, persecute
Cuban transactions and restrict the normal development of all Cuba's
operations abroad, the US government resorts to a variety of instruments
and forms of pressure through its regulatory agencies.
The blockade qualifies as an act of genocide and a flagrant, massive and
systematic violation of the human rights of the entire Cuban people. It is a
cruel policy of punishment, as this report attests through factual
information and data that reinforce the denunciation of this grave injustice.
In addition to the examples already presented, Annex 4 lists four additional
cases of extraterritorial implementation of the blockade between March,
2024 and February, 2025.
Universal rejection of the blockade
The international movement calling for an end to the blockade has been
highly active. More than 2,000 public events, interventions and documents
adopted at international events condemned the blockade, its unjust nature
and its devastating impact on the Cuban people. More than 1,703
40
statements have been made by 57 governments and 107 political parties
against the arbitrary inclusion of the country in the unilateral list of alleged
State sponsors of terrorism. Six hundred individual parliamentarians as
well the parliaments of Russia, Syria, Namibia, Burundi, and Jamaica
signed the Progressive International Initiative. There have also been 473
statements from solidarity movements, associations or groups; 28
statements from international organizations, including those mentioned
above; 254 media reports and 87 interventions by other personalities.
Likewise, members of the US society have increasingly called for an end
to the blockade and the arbitrary designation of Cuba as a State that
allegedly sponsors terrorism. Federal and state congressmen, academics,
economists, politicians, religious leaders, scientists, young people and the
solidarity movement undertook several initiatives to pressure the White
House.
Noteworthy are the statements against the blockade made by numerous
governments and personalities, UN experts, solidarity movements and
associations of Cubans living abroad, parliaments, and heads of State and
Government.
Condemnations of the blockade and its extraterritorial nature were
included in the final documents of the Nineteenth NAM Summit, the Third
South Summit, the resolution against the blockade adopted at the Thirty
Eighth African Union Summit, the Eighth CELAC Summit, the Twenty Third
ALBA-TCP Summit, the statement of the G77-NAM Joint Coordinating
Committee, the Forty Seventh Conference of Heads of Government of
CARICOM, the Forty Eighth Ministerial Meeting of the G77 and China,
among other relevant fora.
It should be pointed out that in July 2024, several special procedures
mandate holders of the UN Human Rights Council4 called for the US
government to lift the blockade and remove Cuba from the list of alleged
States sponsors of terrorism and "... to fully comply with all its international
human rights obligations, including extraterritorially, and take swift action
to end such measures," stating that Cuba's re-designation as a State
sponsor of terrorism has imposed a series of additional economic and
financial restrictions with aggravated adverse effects on the country's
ability to meet the needs of its population at a critical time when Cuba faces
serious economic challenges.
Alena Douhan, Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures; Cecilia M.
Bailliet, United Nations independent expert on human rights and international solidarity; Georgios
Katrougalos, UN independent expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international
order.
4
41
On February 7, 2025, four of these human rights experts5 called for the US
government to end the blockade against Cuba and rejected the new
inclusion of the Island in the list of States sponsors of terrorism by the
Donald Trump administration. They recalled that they had already sent
previous communications on the subject to the US government, without
receiving a response. They denounced that this decision has serious
consequences for the human rights of the Cuban people; negatively
affects the country's commercial and financial relations and hinders
national efforts to address the cumulative effects of the blockade, the
COVID-19 pandemic and natural disasters. They described the measure
as an act of unilateral coercion incompatible with the Charter of the United
Nations and International Law, which violated the UN resolutions declaring
the use of unilateral coercive measures as illegal and called for an end to
the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United
States against Cuba6
On October 18, 2024, Cuba submitted its Ninth Periodic Report to the
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW). The Committee recognized the negative impact of the
economic, commercial, and financial blockade on the enjoyment of human
rights by women and girls in Cuba, as well as the damage caused by
Cuba's unjust inclusion in the list of States that allegedly sponsor terrorism.
Annex 5 lists actions taken during the period under review, within the US
society and at the international level, to reject the blockade.
Conclusions
The economic, commercial, and financial blockade imposed by the US
government against Cuba constitutes a unilateral, coercive and
extraterritorial policy that violates international law and the purposes and
principles of the UN Charter. It undermines the Cuban people's right to
peace, development and self-determination. It is a massive, flagrant, and
systematic violation of their human rights. It undermines the Cuban
economy and directly affects the well-being of the population. It makes no
distinction between social sectors or economic actors. It restricts the
constitutional rights of US citizens and violates the sovereignty of third
countries by imposing extraterritorial sanctions.
Alena Douhan, Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures; Attiya
Waris, UN independent expert on foreign debt; Georgios Katrougalos, UN independent expert on the
promotion of a democratic and equitable international order; Reem Alsalem, UN special rapporteur on
violence against women and girls.
6
See https://www.ohchr.org/es/press-releases/2025/02/united-states-experts-di...
5
42
It is unacceptable, illegitimate, and immoral for any people to be submitted
to a coercive and harmful policy that causes economic damages that
exceeds USD 170,677,200,000 at current prices, and USD
2,103,897,000,000 taking into account the value of the dollar against the
price of gold. Between March, 2024 and February, 2025 alone, the
damages caused by the blockade to Cuba were estimated at USD
7,556,100,000.
The figures and examples presented here will never fully reflect the
harmful impact that the blockade has had on the Cuban people. However,
the US government remains steadfast in its application of this cruel and
illegal policy. After more than 60 years, the main goal pursued by the
blockade has not changed: to deteriorate the standard of living of the
population, provoke dissatisfaction, despair and irritation as a means to
bring about a change in the constitutional order that the Cuban people
have freely chosen.
The US administration persists in ignoring the almost unanimous call of
the international community for an end to this illegal and inhumane policy
against Cuba, expressed in 32 resolutions of the UN General Assembly.
The call for the unconditional lifting of the US blockade is almost universal,
and its cause is a just cause. Voices are multiplying alongside the Cuban
people calling for the immediate lifting of the blockade, the cessation of the
persecution of Cuba's international economic and financial relations, the
elimination of funds allocated to subvert its internal order and carry out
disinformation operations as well as Cuba’s removal from the unilateral list
of State sponsors of terrorism.
Despite all of the above, Cuba remains committed to establishing a
civilized and respectful relationship with the US government through
dialogue and cooperation with all the sectors of the US society that are
interested in improving bilateral relations.
As Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez stated at the closing
ceremony of the Fourth Ordinary Session of the National Assembly of
People's Power in December 2024: "Yes, the blockade exists. Yes, it has
been tightened. Yes, we are faced with an economic war. Yes, they
despise us. Yes, they grossly, obscenely are intoxicating us, filled with
hatred, on the social media. But we also have -and this is what matters the
most-, a heroic and dignified people. And we shall always overcome, as
long as that heroism that runs in the genes of all Cubans, continues to
43
grow bigger and reveals itself before all adversaries with the essential and
sacred component of unity around one single goal: to preserve
independence, sovereignty, and social justice."
44
Annex 1: US blockade laws and regulations.
Trading with the Enemy Act (1917): Section 5(b) delegated to the
head of the executive branch the power to apply coercive measures
in times of war or at any other period of national emergency and
prohibited trade with the enemy or allies of the enemy during armed
conflicts.
Foreign Assistance Act (1961): Authorized the President to establish
and maintain a total “embargo” on trade with Cuba and prohibited
the granting of any aid to the Cuban government.
Presidential Proclamation 3447 (by President Kennedy, February 3,
1962): Decreed a total “embargo” on trade between the US and
Cuba.
Treasury Department Regulations for the Control of Cuban Assets
(1963): Stipulates the freezing of all Cuban assets in the US; the
prohibition of all financial and commercial transactions, unless
approved by a license; the prohibition of Cuban exports to the US;
the prohibition of any natural or legal person from the US or third
countries from conducting transactions in US dollars with Cuba;
among other provisions.
Export Administration Act (1979): Section 2401 (b) (1) “National
Security Control,” “Policy toward Certain States,” establishes the
Trade Control List, in which the President maintains a number of
countries that may be subject to special export controls for national
security considerations. Cuba is included in that list.
Export Administration Regulations (1979): Establishes a denial
policy for exports and re-exports to Cuba.
Cuban Democracy Act or Torricelli Act (1992): Prohibits subsidiaries
of US companies in third countries from trading goods with Cuba or
Cuban nationals. It prohibits third-country ships that call at Cuban
ports from entering US territory within 180 days, except those
licensed by the Treasury.
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act or Helms-Burton Act
(1996): Codified the provisions of the blockade, expanding its
45
extraterritorial scope by imposing sanctions on executives of foreign
companies that conduct transactions with US properties nationalized
in Cuba and threatening lawsuits in US courts. It limited the
president's prerogatives to lift the blockade policy as a whole.
Section 211 of the Supplemental and Emergency Appropriations Act
for Fiscal Year 1999: It prohibits US courts from recognizing the
rights of Cuban companies to trademarks associated with
nationalized property.
Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (2000): It
authorized the export of agricultural products to Cuba, conditional on
cash payment in advance and without US financing. It prohibited
U.S. citizens from traveling to Cuba for tourism purposes, defining
“tourism activity” as any activity related to travel to, from, or within
Cuba that was not expressly authorized under section 515.560 of
Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations. In other words, it limited
travel only to the 12 categories that were authorized at the time when
this legislation was enacted.
Annex 2: Blockade measures adopted by the US government
between March, 2024 and February, 2025.
On March 15, 2024, OFAC imposed a penalty of 3 740 442.00 dollars on
the banking company EFG International AG for violating the Cuban Assets
Control Regulations and other sanctions programs.
On March 23, 2024, President Biden signed the Appropriations Bill for
fiscal year 2024, which allocated 25 million dollars for illegal radio and
television broadcasts to Cuba and the same amount for programs
supposedly supporting democracy. It was clarified that these funds could
not be used for the promotion of business, economic reforms,
entrepreneurship or any other activity in Cuba not authorized under the
Helms-Burton and Torricelli laws.
On September 9, 2024, OFAC issued a final rule (CFR Part 501)
extending from five to ten years the period during which persons subject
to US jurisdiction, who provide authorized services to Cuba, are required
to maintain records in relation to such services.
On September 13, 2024, President Biden extended the restrictions of the
blockade against Cuba under the Trading with the Enemy Act for one year.
46
On September 27, 2024, President Biden issued a presidential
determination to the Secretary of State for submission to Congress,
instructing the U.S. executive director of each multilateral development
bank and the International Monetary Fund to make every effort to deny
any loan or other use of the respective institution's funds for Cuba.
On December 2, 2024, the US president signed the bipartisan, bicameral
bill “No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act of 2023,” codifying it
into law, which added up to the blockade measures.
On December 13, 2024, OFAC announced a settlement in the amount of
257 thousand 690 dollars reached with the global transportation and
logistics company C.H. Robinson International Inc. The measure was due
to violations of coercive programs against Iran and Cuba for transporting
products to these nations on multiple occasions.
On January 20, 2025, President Trump, on his first day in office, signed
the Executive Order “Initial Rescissions of Executive Orders and Actions
Detrimental to the United States,” which repealed a significant portion of
the measures toward Cuba taken by Biden on January 14 and ordered the
re-creation of the list of restricted entities.
On January 31, 2025, the State Department announced the revocation of
the suspension of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act.
On February 5, 2025, the State Department published an update to the
Restricted Entities List for Cuba, with the addition of Orbit.SA, a Cuban
company dedicated to processing remittances.
On February 21, 2025, the White House published the memorandum
“America First, Investment Policy” to facilitate investments from allied
countries and restrict the investment capabilities of China and countries
considered “foreign adversaries.” Cuba is considered an adversary, and
access to US technology, especially in artificial intelligence, is limited.
On February 25, 2025, the Secretary of State announced the expansion
of the visa restriction policy for individuals who “exploit Cuban labor.” The
measure seeks to intensify financial persecution of Cuba by targeting the
country's incomes from medical cooperation programs and promoting the
severance of relations with other countries by applying visa sanctions to
current or former Cuban government officials and other individuals,
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including foreign government officials and their family members, involved
in what it considers a “Cuban labor export program,” particularly Cuba's
medical missions abroad.
In March 2025, the US government announced the termination of the
humanitarian parole program for Cubans, Haitians, Venezuelans and
Nicaraguans and the implementation of CBP One.
On March 19, 2025, the US government included Cuba in the list of
countries that do not maintain “effective anti-terrorism measures” in their
ports. The measure authorizes the US Coast Guard to impose entry
requirements on vessels coming from Cuban territory.
On June 30, 2025, the US government reissued Presidential
Memorandum No. 5, ratifying the policy of maximum economic pressure
as a criminal and illegal instrument to achieve hegemonic objectives and
regime change in Cuba. The new document joins the list of coercive
measures against Cuba that existed previously and provides a platform for
refining the mechanisms of economic and political coercion against the
country and against third countries with ties to Cuba.
Annex 3: Prerogatives of the US President to modify the
implementation of the blockade against Cuba.
- Remove Cuba from the State Department's list of State sponsors of
terrorism.
- Reverse the policy of financial persecution against Cuba, including
the one related to fuel supplies to the country.
- Suspend the possibility of filing lawsuits in US courts against US and
third-country companies under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act.
- Modify the permissible limit of 10 per cent of US components in
goods that Cuba can import from any country in the world.
- Request that the State and Treasury Departments remove Cuban
entities from other unilateral lists, such as the List of Restricted
Cuban Entities, the List of Prohibited Accommodations and the List
of Specially Designated Nationals.
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- Instruct US representatives in international financial institutions not
to block loans or other financial facilities to Cuba.
- Enable Cuban entities to open correspondent accounts in US banks.
- Authorize exports to Cuba of US products for key sectors of the
economy, such as mining, tourism and biotechnology.
- Authorize the importation by the US of any merchandise
manufactured or derived from products grown, produced or
manufactured in Cuba by state-owned enterprises (nickel, sugar,
tobacco, rum or others).
- Allow the export to Cuba of medical supplies and equipment that can
be used in the manufacture of Cuban biotechnology products.
- Relax the policy to grant licenses to US companies to invest in Cuba.
- Authorize US citizens to receive medical treatment in Cuba.
- Authorize broader forms of cooperation for the development,
marketing and supply of Cuban-made medicines and biomedical
products, for example, through direct investments by US companies
and joint ventures.
- Authorize sales of the raw materials that Cuba needs to produce
medicines for the Cuban population and other developing countries.
- Authorize US subsidiaries to do business with Cuba that is not
related to the import and export of goods to Cuba (prohibited by the
Torricelli Act).
Annex 4: Some examples of the extraterritorial implementation of the
blockade against Cuba between March, 2024 and February, 2025.
In March, 2024, OFAC denied Cuba the possibility of opening a bank
account in Japan for the purpose of participating in EXPO Osaka 2025.
This increased the costs for Cuba and made it difficult for the country to
attend this international event.
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On March 15, 2024, the Treasury Department's OFAC imposed a penalty
of 3 740 442.00 dollars on the Swiss-based banking company EFG
International AG for violating the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and
other sanctions programs.
On April 15, 2024, the YPF company in Argentina officially announced
that it could no longer supply fuel to Cubana de Aviación, since its
commercial relationship could pose a risk and exposure under US
regulations.
In early June, 2024, the Courtyard hotel, belonging to the Marriot hotel
network, refused a request from the Cuban embassy in Trinidad and
Tobago to book an accommodation for the Cuban delegation attending the
Small Island States Conference in Antigua and Barbuda, citing the
restrictions of the blockade.
On June 12, 2024, the bank Societé Générale in Senegal issued a letter
announcing the closure of the account belonging to the Cuban Embassy
in Senegal. This was in response to the implementation of the blockade
and the impact of Cuba's designation as a State sponsor of terrorism.
Since August, 2024, the company Presencia Latinoamericana S.A.,
specialized in the promotion and marketing of Cuban cultural products and
services in Mexico, has been affected by its inclusion on the US State
Department's list of restricted entities. An example of this was the fact that
BBVA bank canceled that company's accounts, claiming that transactions
towards Cuba were prohibited under the provisions of the blockade.
On September 30, 2024, a high official from Honduras was denied
renewal of her ESTA visa with her Spanish passport because she had
traveled to Cuba.
On October 3, 2024, the Cuban embassy in Dominica reported that the
National Bank of Dominica was unable to make a donation to Cuba
because the intermediary bank was the Bank of America, which does not
authorize such transactions.
On November 29, 2024, the Mexican bank INBURSA announced the
cancellation of the Cuban account belonging to Taíno Tours, for this was
“in the interest of the institution.” In practice, this was the results of the
pressures from the United States as part of the blockade against Cuba.
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On December 13, 2024, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of
the US Treasury Department announced a 257 690 dollars settlement with
the company C.H. Robinson International Inc. (CHR) to resolve its
potential civil liability for 82 apparent violations committed by five of its
subsidiaries outside the United States, which provided freight brokerage
or transportation services for shipments in an apparent violation of OFAC
sanctions against Cuba and Iran.
In January, 2025, the Belgian bank KBC refused to issue a credit card to
the staff of the Cuban Embassy in Belgium, claiming compliance with the
national legislation and the bank's internal policies on the prevention of
money laundering and terrorist financing, which showed its alignment with
the US government's extraterritorial blockade policy against Cuba. Thus,
that banking institution limited the financial operations it had maintained
with the embassy since 1991.
In April, 2025, it became known that the owners of the aircraft of a Serbian
airline would not authorize their planes to fly to Cuba due to the
extraterritorial effect of the US blockade against Cuba, thus limiting the
flow of travelers, particularly tourists, from Serbia to Cuba.
In June, 2025, the web platform Stripe notified the coordinators of the
Solidarity with Cuba Campaign “From Australia to Cuba with Love” that
their account on the platform was being closed because Cuba was a “risk
jurisdiction.” Through this site, the Campaign raised funds for donations to
Cuban hospitals and various projects in the country.
Annex 5: Actions denouncing the blockade against Cuba between
March, 2024 and May, 2025
Denunciations of the blockade within the United States:
On April 2, 2024, political, religious, and civil rights leaders in Maryland
sent a letter to Ben Cardin, then a federal senator and chairman of the
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, calling for the lifting of the
blockade against Cuba. The coalition of more than a hundred groups and
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individuals claimed that the US government's sanctions are the main
cause of the terrible humanitarian and economic conditions on the Island.
On April 29, 2024, the renowned economist, professor of Columbia
University and political analyst Jeffrey Sachs called for the lifting of the
blockade and an end to the US government's hostile policy toward Cuba
at the conclusion of his speech at the Progressive International event on
the New International Economic Order, held in Havana.
In early May, 2025, the Seventeenth May Day Brigade, which visited Cuba
to celebrate the International Workers' Day, expressed its support to the
lifting the economic blockade and the end of the US government's hostile
policy.
On May 6, 2024, the Alliance for Commitment and Respect for Cuba
(ACERE), based in Washington, D.C., coordinated the sending of a letter
to President Joseph Biden, demanding the fulfillment of his 2020 campaign
promises with regard to the policy toward Cuba, the end of the blockade
and the removal of Cuba from the list of State sponsors of terrorism.
Signatories included Cuban Americans; former federal, state, and local
officials; academics; business owners, executives and investors; lawyers;
doctors; scientists; educators; artists, musicians and filmmakers, among
others.
On May 21, 2024, at a congressional hearing, Representative Jim
McGovern asked the Biden administration to remove Cuba from the list of
State sponsors of terrorism, recognizing its impact on the suffering of the
Cuban people and the increase in migration flows.
On June 5, 2024, Congresswomen Pramila Jayapal (Washington), Ilhan
Omar (Minnesota) and Nydia Velázquez (New York) asked Biden, in a
public statement, to remove Cuba from the List of State Sponsors of
Terrorism.
On June 6, 2024, the Communist Party of the United States approved, as
part of its Thirty Second Convention, a resolution in favor of removing
Cuba from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism and the lifting the
blockade.
On June 17, 2024, the ‘Cuba Sí’ Coalition of New York and New Jersey
issued a statement calling for the Biden administration to remove Cuba
from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism and end the blockade.
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On June 18, 2024, the president of the Executive Committee of the South
Pacific Inland Boatmen's Union of California, part of the Marine Division of
the International Longshoremen's and Warehouse Union (ILWU), included
in the final document of its Thirty Ninth International Convention the
resolution “Send pacemakers to Cuba and end the blockade.” It called for
Cuba's removal from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.
On July 5, 2024, the International Committee of the Democratic Socialists
of America (DSA) reported that a total of 760 letters had been sent via the
‘Activa Network’ platform to US senators in favor of removing Cuba from
the list of State sponsors of terrorism.
On July 25, 2024, the Latin America Working Group, the Washington
Office on Latin America (WOLA), the Alliance for Commitment and
Respect for Cuba (ACERE), and the Center for Economic and Policy
Research (CEPR) drafted a letter addressed to president Biden calling for
Cuba’s removal from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.
On July 27, 2024, Max Lesnik, director of Radio Miami Today; and Carlos
Lazo, coordinator of the movement ‘Puentes de Amor’ called for an end to
the blockade and Cuba's removal from the List of State Sponsors of
Terrorism as part of a demonstration at Miami Airport.
On July 31, 2024, 46 Democratic members of Congress sent a letter to
Biden in support of the peace process in Colombia, in which they
demanded Cuba's removal from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.
On August 12, 2024, 40 legal organizations and 200 lawyers sent a letter
to Biden in favor of ending the US economic sanctions against other
countries. The letter specifically mentioned the need to lift the blockade
against Cuba.
On November 19, 2024, 18 members of Congress, led by Democrats
Barbara Lee and James McGovern, sent a letter to President Biden
explaining the need to ease coercive measures against Cuba; remove the
country from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism; offer technical
assistance and emergency humanitarian aid and facilitate means for the
modernization and repair of Cuba's energy infrastructure.
On December 17, 2024, Senators Peter Welch, Jeffrey A. Merkley,
Bernard Sanders, Ron Wyden, and Chris Van Hollen sent a letter to thenPresident Biden, urging him to remove Cuba from the List of State
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Sponsors of Terrorism; restore US citizens’ right to freely travel to Cuba
and end the Trump-era “Cuba prohibition lists.”
On December 17, 2024, former Havana Chief of Mission Vicki Huddleston
and former Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes sent a letter to
Biden urging the outgoing administration to remove Cuba from the List of
State Sponsors of Terrorism; increase humanitarian aid to the country and
streamline regulations for Cuban citizens to access the US financial
system.
On January 25, 2025, Senator Peter Welch rejected Cuba's new
designation on the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.
At the international level, the following actions stand out:
On June 15, 2024, the Declaration of the NAM-G77 Joint Coordination
Committee, calling for the removal of Cuba from the List of State Sponsors
of Terrorism and an end to the blockade was adopted
On June 19, 2024, a special communiqué was issued by the Group of
Friends in Defense of the UN Charter in New York, condemning the
blockade and demanding Cuba's removal from the List of States that
Allegedly sponsor of terrorism.
On June 27, 2024, at the Fifty Sixth Session of the Human Rights Council,
a declaration was presented by 123 countries demanding the removal of
Cuba from the unilateral List of States that Allegedly Sponsor Terrorism.
On July 30, 2024, the Forty Seventh CARICOM Heads of Government
Conference in Grenada approved a Declaration condemning the blockade
against Cuba and its inclusion in the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.
On September 27, 2024, the Declaration adopted at the Forty Eighth G77
and China Ministerial Meeting held in New York, not only called for an end
to the blockade against Cuba, but also, for the first time, condemned
Cuba's inclusion in the arbitrary List of States that allegedly Sponsor
Terrorism.
From September 24 to 30 of 2024, during the General Debate of the
Seventy Ninth Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA),
the heads of delegations from 46 countries included in their speeches a
condemnation of the blockade against Cuba. In 23 of these references,
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Cuba's inclusion in the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism was also
denounced.
On October 30, 2024, UNGA approved, by 187 votes in favor, 2 against,
and 1 abstention, the resolution on the “Necessity of ending the economic,
commercial, and financial blockade imposed by the United States of
America against Cuba.” Fifty-four speakers spoke in favor of lifting the
blockade and 43 of them against the inclusion of Cuba in the List of State
Sponsors of Terrorism. Nine consultation groups and regional
organizations joined both denunciations, namely: the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean
States (CELAC), the Group of 77 and China, the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM), the Group of Friends in Defense of the Charter, the NonAligned Movement (NAM), the African Group, and the European Union.
On December 14, 2024, the Declaration of the Twenty Fourth Summit of
Heads of State and Government of ALBA-TCP was adopted, which, in
addition to condemning the blockade, denounced the inclusion of Cuba in
the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.
On February 15, 2025, at the Thirty Eighth Summit of Heads of State and
Government of the African Union (AU) held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the
resolution on the lifting of the blockade imposed on Cuba by the US
government was approved for the sixteenth consecutive time. The text
also calls for the removal of Cuba from the List of State Sponsors of
Terrorism.
In March, 2025, the countries that are members of the Group of Friends
in Defense of the United Nations Charter issued a strong statement at the
UN Human Rights Council condemning the new inclusion of Cuba in the
US government unilateral list of countries allegedly sponsoring terrorism.
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